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I. INTRODUCTION
State and federal water policies have traditionally accepted eco-
nomic development as a principal objective.1 Federal transportation,
hydropower generation, and reclamation policies have been perceived
as instrumental in helping a developing nation reach its economic po-
tential. Because these economic development objectives have been
largely achieved, public concern in recent years has changed from the
development of natural resources to a greater emphasis on their pro-
tection and preservation.2 Enactment of federal and state environ-
mental legislation reflecting these more recent concerns has resulted
in inconsistent federal and state water policies. Emphasis on imple-
menting reclamation, flood control, and hydropower production pro-
grams has changed to accommodate environmental objectives,
although integration of development and environmental objectives is a
continuing struggle. In addition, federal taxing and budget constraints
have triggered a greater interest in governmental efficiency and re-
duced public expenditures. Consequently, federal water development
programs are being subjected to closer budget scrutiny.
Nebraska's water policies have paralleled federal policies. Histori-
cally Nebraska water law has sought to facilitate private and public
irrigation development. The irrigation crusade of the 1880s
culminated in the adoption of the irrigation code of 1895, which re-
mains the foundation of Nebraska surface water law. Federal adoption
of the 1902 Reclamation Act provided federal financial subsidies for
public irrigation projects. Nebraska adopted the required irrigation
district, reclamation district, and public power district organization
statutes to allow irrigators to participate in federal irrigation projects.
Initially, federal reclamation policies of subsidizing public irriga-
tion projects could be justified as encouraging the settlement and agri-
cultural development of what was considered to be a vast wasteland.
1. B. HOLMES, HISTORY OF FEDERAL WATER RESOURCES PROGRAMS AND POLICIES,
1961-70, at 1800-1960 (U.S. Dep't of Agric., Misc. Pub. No. 1233) (1972) [hereinaf-
ter cited as HOLMES I].
2. B. HOLMES, HISTORY OF FEDERAL WATER REsoURCEs PROGRAMS AND POLICIES,
1961-70 (U.S. Dep't of Agric., Misc. Pub. No. 1379) (1979) [hereinafter cited as
HOLMES II].
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During the Depression, reclamation policies were subsumed by larger
federal public works programs in an effort to stimulate employment.
In the postwar period reclamation policies enjoyed broad political sup-
port. However, the environmental movement of the 1970s and the fed-
eral budget constraints of the 1980s have dealt significant blows to
traditional federal reclamation policies.
Nebraska participated in public irrigation project development
during the golden era of water development. However, the 1936 Oster-
man restriction on interbasin transfers3 constrained federal project
development until the 1980 Little Blue 14 case authorized transbasin
diversions. At the same time, farmers developed the plentiful ground
water resources of Nebraska to increase total irrigated acreage to sev-
eral times what could be supplied by streams and impoundments
alone. This intensive ground water development led to declining
ground water supplies in many areas of Nebraska. The threat of
ground water depletion has led local irrigators to seek "rescue
projects," i.e., public irrigation projects to supply the irrigation water
lost to ground water depletion. When Little Blue I opened the Platte
River to development by irrigators outside the Platte valley, the race
for Platte River water began.
However, state and federal environmental and financial policy
changes have made it more difficult to develop the Platte (and other
Nebraska rivers) for irrigation: the golden age of water development
has already passed. President Carter's water project hit list and pro-
posed water policy reforms have resulted in significantly reduced fed-
eral financial assistance for public irrigation projects. In addition,
Little Blue II ruled that water projects must comply with state endan-
gered species statutes.5 This decision highlighted a bitter conflict be-
tween water developers and environmentalists and brought water
development in Nebraska to a standstill.
To break this water development logjam, Nebraska Governor Bob
Kerrey appointed a "Water Independence Congress" in 1983 to recom-
mend new water policies to accommodate water development and en-
vironmental concerns, and to adapt to new federal water financing
policies. Water Congress recommendations were adopted in 1984 and
resulted in the creation of a Water Management Board to oversee and
promote water project development in Nebraska.
This Article will trace the development of Nebraska and federal
water development policies with special reference to the appropriate-
3. Osterman v. Cent. Neb. Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 131 Neb. 356, 268 N.W. 334
(1936).
4. Little Blue Natural Resources Dist. v. Lower Platte North Natural Resources
Dist., 206 Neb. 535, 294 N.W.2d 598 (1980) [Little Blue I].
5. Little Blue Natural Resources Dist. v. Lower Platte North Natural Resources
Dist., 210 Neb. 862, 317 N.W,2d 726 (1982) [Little Blue 11].
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ness of publicly subsidized rescue projects to cope with ground water
depletion.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF STATE AND FEDERAL WATER
DEVELOPMENT POLICIES
A. Appropriation and Reclamation: 1867-1929
Historically the major emphasis of Nebraska water law has been
on facilitating irrigation development. The first step was replacing the
common law riparian doctrine with the statutory surface water alloca-
tion doctrine of prior appropriation. Under the riparian doctrine, each
owner of land bordering a natural stream or lake has the coequal right
to make a reasonable use of water flowing past his property.6 Ripa-
rian conflicts are resolved through private litigation, the outcome of
which is not easily predictable.1 The riparian doctrine does not facili-
tate irrigation for three main reasons: (1) nonriparians are not enti-
tled to use streamflow,8 (2) litigation is a costly and uncertain way to
determine rights when water supplies are inadequate, 9 and (3) dor-
mant riparian rights could be exercised to the detriment of existing
riparian (and nonriparian) uses.1 0 In contrast, appropriative water
rights are more certain. Water may be used on nonriparian land, the
amount of water is fixed, and new users take subject to existing
6. Wasserberger v. Coffee, 180 Neb. 149, 141 N.W.2d 738 (1966). See Comment, The
Dual-System of Water Rights in Nebraska, 48 NEB. L. REV. 488 (1969) [hereinaf-
ter Dual-System].
7. See R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, NEBRASKA WATER LAw AND ADmiISTRA-
TION 19-22 (1984).
8. In public irrigation projects most of the land irrigated will often be land located
near the stream or reservoir. The river valley land may often be the best suited
for irrigation. In addition, the closer the land to be irrigated is to the source of
supply, the less costly is the delivery of irrigation water. However, restricting
water use to riparian land would prevent most of the land within a river valley
from being irrigated because the land tract was not physically contiguous to the
stream.
9. In the West, precipitation, and therefore streamflow, is irregular. However, the
need for supplemental irrigation water will be greatest during periods of low pre-
cipitation, and therefore, periods of low streamflow: the need for water will be
greatest when the supply is the lowest. Thus, regular and predictable resolution
of the inevitable water use conflicts is important. Under the riparian doctrine
disputes are resolved by private litigation, the nature of which does not promote
predictability. In resolving riparian disputes Nebraska courts are likely to bal-
ance the equities by following the Restatement of Torts. See Wasserberger v.
Coffee, 180 Neb. 149, 141 N.W.2d 738 (1966); HARNSBERGER & THORSON, supra
note 7, at 54-57.
10. Riparian rights are not lost by nonuse. 2 H. FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS § 463 (1904). Riparians may initiate new uses at any time which
may interfere with existing uses, thus adding an additional element of uncer-
tainty to the riparian system.
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users.11 The appropriation doctrine was developed to remedy the de-
fects of the riparian doctrine in an arid environment. Thus replace-
ment of the riparian doctrine with the appropriative doctrine was the
first step to facilitate private irrigation development in Nebraska. 2
The Nebraska Supreme Court decisively rejected the appropriative
doctrine in several early cases.13 The unacceptable legal uncertainty
resulting from riparian rights jeopardized the significant investment
required for irrigation, and led to a political crusade to adopt appropri-
ation statutes to promote surface water irrigation in Nebraska.14 Sub-
sequent statutory development included the irrigation acts of 1877 and
1889, and the 1895 irrigation code which is the basis of current appro-
priation statutes.
In 1877 the Nebraska Legislature took the first step towards the
legal recognition of prior appropriation by enacting a brief statute giv-
ing corporations organized for irrigation purposes the power of con-
demnation to acquire rights of way for canals, dams and reservoirs.1 5
The 1889 irrigation act explicitly recognized the doctrine of prior ap-
propriation. 16 The act adopted the principle of priority: "As between
appropriators the first one in time is the first one in right."17 The
procedure for appropriating water was reminiscent of the customs de-
veloped in the mining camps of the California gold rush.1 8 To appro-
11. Trelease, Law, Water and People: The Role of Water Law in Conserving and
Developing Natural Resources in the West, 18 WYo. L.J. 3 (1963).
12. For a more complete discussion of the inappropriateness of the riparian doctrine
to foster irrigation, see Trelease, supra note 11; Fischer, Harnsberger & Oeltjen,
Rights to Nebraska Streamflows: An Historical Overview with Recommenda-
tions, 52 NEB. L. REV. 313, 339-40 (1973); R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, supra
note 7, at 122-25.
13. Clark v. Cambridge & Arapahoe Irrigation & Improvement Co., 45 Neb. 798, 64
N.W. 239 (1895); Meng v. Coffee, 67 Neb. 500, 93 N.W. 713 (1903). For citations of
earlier non-irrigation cases see 1 WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES
138-40, n.12 (3d ed. 1911).
14. For an excellent account of this irrigation crusade see Fischer, Harnsberger &
Oeltjen, supra note 12, at 342-48.
15. Act of February 19, 1877, Ch. 16, § 158 Neb. Laws 168 (repealed 1889). See
Fischer, Harnsberger & Oeltjen, supra note 12, at 333-34; HARNSBERGER & THOR-
SON, supra note 7, at 64. While the 1877 Act did not explicitly provide a procedure
for acquiring appropriative water rights, the Nebraska Supreme Court subse-
quently ruled that a common law appropriative procedure was implied. Kearney
Water & Elec. Powers Co. v. Alfalfa Irrigation Dist., 97 Neb. 139, 149 N.W. 363
(1914). That is, an appropriator acquired his right by diverting water and apply-
ing it to a beneficial use.
16. Act of March 27, 1889, ch. 68, §§ 1-15, 1889 Neb. Laws 503 [hereinafter 1889 Act].
See Fischer, Harnsberger & Oeltjen, supra note 12, at 334-40; R. HARNSBERGER &
N. THORSON, supra note 7, at 64-67.
17. 1889 Act, § 7 (currently codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-203 (1984)).
18. For an excellent account of the California gold rush and its impact on the devel-
opment of the appropriation doctrine, see McGowen, The Development of Polit-
ical Institutions on the Public Domain, 11 Wyo. L.J. 1 (1956).
[Vol. 66:8
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priate water one was required to post a notice in writing in a
conspicuous place at the point of diversion stating (1) a claim specify-
ing the amount of water to be diverted and a description of the point of
diversion, (2) the purpose for which water would be used and the place
of use, and (3) the size and type of diversion works.' 9 A copy of the
notice was required to be filed with the local county clerk within ten
days of its being posted.20 The claimant was required to begin con-
struction of his diversion works and "prosecute the work diligently
and uninterruptedly to completion unless temporarily interrupted by
snow or rain."21 If the claimant complied with these rules his priority
date related back to the posting of the notice.22 Failure to comply with
these provisions worked a loss of priority as against a subsequent ap-
propriator who complied with the rules.23 The act also recognized
prior common law appropriations.2 4
A significant limitation of the 1889 act was its failure to provide an
administrative mechanism for supervising the grant and exercise of
appropriations.25 Thus priority among appropriators had to be en-
forced through private litigation. Determining the priority and extent
of rights was difficult as records were kept at the county level, rather
than on a state-wide basis. A prospective irrigator would have needed
to search the county records to the source of the stream to determine
his relative priority.
While the 1889 act was little more than codification of common law
appropriation principles, the 1895 irrigation code created a compre-
hensive administrative system for acquiring and administering water
rights.26 The 1895 code replaced the 1889 system of acquiring an ap-
propriation by use with an administrative system, administered by the
19. 1889 Act, § 8 (repealed 1895).
20. Id.
21. Id. at § 9.
22. Id at § 11. This is the beginning of the important "relation back" doctrine under
which an appropriator's priority date relates back to when the work on the appro-
priation was initiated so long as the diversion was completed with "due dili-
gence." See infra note 39.
23. 1889 Act, § 12 (repealed 1985).
24. Id. at § 11. The act also abrogated riparian rights on streams wider than 50 feet.
Id. § 1. This was amended in 1893 to apply only to streams wider than 20 feet.
Act of March 31, 1893, ch. 40, § 1, 1893 Neb. Laws 377 (repealed 1895) [hereinafter
1893 Act]. The provisions restricting riparian rights were held invalid in Clark v.
Cambridge and Arapahoe Irrigation & Improvement Co., 45 Neb. 798, 64 N.W. 239
(1895).
25. Fischer, Harnsberger & Oeltjen, supra note 12, at 337-38; HARNSBERGER & THOR-
SON, supra note 7, at 67.
26. Act of April 4, 1895, ch. 69, §§ 1-69, 1895 Neb. Laws 244 (codified as amended at
NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-201 to -263 (1984)) [hereinafter 1895 Act]. See Fischer,
Harnsberger & Oeltjen, supra note 12, at 348-58; R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON,
supra note 7, at 64-73. The Nebraska statute was patterned after Wyoming's ap-
propriation statute, which was the first to establish an agency to grant and admin-
1987]
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state board of irrigation (now the Department of Water Resources),
for acquiring new appropriations and for administering appropria-
tions.27 The establishment of an administrative agency to grant and
administer appropriative rights is the most significant aspect of the
1895 code. Appropriations could be acquired only by filing with the
board of irrigation,28 which was authorized to deny a permit if a
stream were over-appropriated, or if granting the permit was not in
the public interest.2 9 Appropriation records were centralized with the
board of irrigation, making the investigation of outstanding appropria-
tive rights much simpler. Finally, resolution of appropriative disputes
was made an administrative function.3 0 Relative priorities were estab-
lished through adjudication of existing rights3 3 or when the permit
was filed with the board of irrigation for new rights.32 The board also
adjudicated the quantity of water to which an appropriator was enti-
tled.33 These issues would no longer be required to be determined
through litigation. Similarly, a senior appropriator could notify the
board of irrigation when he was not receiving the quantity of water he
was entitled to divert, rather than suing the upstream junior appropri-
ator. Thus the basis for resolving appropriative disputes was clarified
and an administrative mechanism for resolving such disputes on a rou-
tine basis was established.34
The significance of the 1895 irrigation code in encouraging irriga-
ister appropriations. Fischer, Harnsberger & Qeltjen, supra note 12, at 347; R.
HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, supra note 7, at 69-70.
27. 1895 Act, § 4 (repealed 1919) (state board of irrigation established); §§ 19-27 (adju-
dicating existing claims); §§ 28-31 (procedures for new appropriations). See
Fischer, Harnsberger & Oeltjen, supra note 12, at 349-54; R. HARNSBERGER & N.
THORSON, supra note 7, at 70-73. For a discussion of current appropriation proce-
dures see id. at 73-86.
28. 1895 Act, § 28 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-233 (1984)).
29. Id- (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-234 to -235 (1984)).
30. 1895 Act, § 50 (codified as amended at NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-263 (1984)). For a
good discussion of problems in administering priorities see R. HARNSBERGER & N.
THORSON, supra note 7, at 92-97.
31. 1895 Act, §§ 16, 19-25 (codified, as amended, at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-226 to -231
(1984)). See Fischer, Harnsberger & Qeltjen, supra note 12, at 350-52.
32. 1895 Act, § 31 (codified as amended at NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-205 (1984)).
33. Id § 28 (new appropriations); § 20 (adjudicated appropriations) (codified as
amended at NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-231 (1984)). See R. HARNSBERGER & N. THOR-
SON, supra note 7, at 78-80.
34. The 1895 irrigation code also cut off the acquisition of new riparian rights as of
the act's effective date, April 4, 1895. But it did not provide a specific means for
resolving riparian-appropriative disputes involving those riparian rights which
had already vested. See Wasserburger v. Coffee, 180 Neb. 149, 141 N.W.2d 738
(1966); Dual-System, supra note 6; Fischer, Harnsberger & Qeltjen, supra note 12,
at 358-63; R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, supra note 7, at 97-112.
For a useful analysis of Nebraska's prior appropriation system see Yeutter, A
Legal-Economic Critique of Nebraska Watercourse Law, 44 NEB. L. REV. 11
(1965).
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tion development cannot be overstated. The code was absolutely nec-
essary to developing large scale irrigation projects in Nebraska. Those
wishing to develop individual or collective irrigation projects had all
the legal tools they needed to obtain secure water rights for their pro-
ject. Prior to making any investment the prospective irrigators could
survey the stream to determine the number of appropriators and the
quantity of their claims. This allowed the prospective appropriator to
determine the likelihood of water being available to him if he obtained
an appropriation. An appropriation would have a fixed quantity and
priority date rather than having a coequal right to share a stream with
other users.3 5 Perhaps the most significant change was the adminis-
tration of priorities. No longer would a senior appropriator be re-
quired to obtain a court order to close an upstream junior's headgate
when the senior needed the water. A call to the Department of Water
Resources (DWR) would result in an immediate investigation and,
usually, the issuance of closing orders to the junior appropriator.36
These changes were significant both for individual irrigators and
for those wishing to promote collective irrigation projects. The earli-
est appropriations tended to be natural flow appropriations, 3 7 i.e.,
rights to divert water directly from the stream. As natural flow ap-
propriations use the reliably available streamflow, later appropriators
are required to incorporate water storage into their irrigation projects
to obtain a secure water supply. Thus storage appropriations are used
to store water during the non-irrigation season for use during the sum-
mer months.38 The ability to make a realistic legal evaluation of
stream conditions and existing uses, and to obtain water rights with
fixed quantities and priorities which would be administratively en-
forced, provided the security necessary to encourage irrigation devel-
opment. 39 If irrigation projects would fail, it would be primarily
35. As Trelease has noted, "an equal share of water that was insufficient for all
would lead to a parceling out of the waters in shares that were sufficient for no
one." Trelease, supra note 11, at 9.
36. When DWR personnel investigate to determine whether an upstream junior is
diverting water which a downstream senior needs, the DWR ditch rider will first
determine how much water the junior is diverting. The junior may be diverting
more than allowed by his appropriation permit. If restricting the junior to his
authorized rate of diversion will release enough streamflow for the senior, the
junior will not be issued a closing order. If the streamflow to the senior is still
inadequate, however, the dosing order will be issued. When the senior has di-
verted as much as he is entitled to, the junior will again be allowed to resume
diversions.
37. For a discussion of how the priority rule encourages junior appropriators to ob-
tain secure rights to water by developing storage see Trelease, supra note 11, at 9-
10.
38. For a discussion of the difference between natural flow appropriations and stor-
age appropriations, and the difference in their administration, see R. HARNs-
BERGER & N. THORSON, supra note 7, at 74-84.
39. Proposed irrigation projects created an element of uncertainty for prospective
1987]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
because available streamflow was overestimated,40 not because water
rights were insecure or difficult to enforce.41
In addition to the appropriation code, irrigation district legislation
was enacted in 1895.42 The irrigation district act provided the legal
and financial tools necessary for irrigators to develop a large scale irri-
gation project, just as the irrigation code removed the legal impedi-
ments created by the riparian doctrine to such projects. The irrigation
district act allows a majority of landowners or leaseholders (now re-
ferred to as electors)43 to propose to organize an irrigation district by
petition.44 If a majority of voting electors vote to organize an irriga-
tion district, the district is established.45 The district, governed by an
elected board of directors,46 may establish water charges or land as-
sessments (i.e. property taxes) to pay for district organization, opera-
tion and maintenance.47  Districts are authorized to construct
irrigation canals and reservoirs.48 Construction bonds to pay for the
appropriators attempting to project current and future stream conditions. There
is a significant time lag between when appropriations have been obtained for an
irrigation project and when the project is actually constructed and water di-
verted. Moreover, obtaining appropriations for a project is no guarantee that the
project will ultimately be completed. For reclamation projects, federal funding
must be obtained. Given the current vagaries of federal water project funding,
federal funding cannot be guaranteed. See B. ANDREWS & M. SANSONE, WHO
RUNS THE RIVERS? DAMs AND DECISIONS IN THE NEW WEST, 167-71 (1983). This is
important to the prospective appropriator as well as appropriators who obtain
their rights in the interim between water project appropriation approval and pro-
ject implementation. If the project is constructed and put into operation, the pro-
ject's priority date relates back to the date the appropriation permits were
originally filed, so long as the appropriator "diligently" pursues the construction
of the irrigation project. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-205 (1984). See R. HARNSBERGER &
N. THORSON, supra note 7, at 84-86. Appropriation officials have construed the
due diligence requirement liberally, bending over backwards to give project spon-
sors every opportunity to obtain the required federal funding to prosecute the
project. Thus the prospective appropriator who relies on the water allocated to a
pending water project becomes a speculator gambling on completion of the
project.
40. For a brief discussion of data problems with planning water projects, including
constructing reservoirs that never fill because of inadequate streamflow, see NA-
TIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 528 (1973).
41. The federal government also recognized the doctrine of prior appropriation in the
1877 Desert Land Act, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (codified at 43 U.S.C § 321). See R.
HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, supra note 7, at 125-32.
42. 1895 Act, § 1 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-101 (1984).
43. An elector must own at least 15 acres or lease at least 40 acres within the pro-
posed irrigation district. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-102 (1984).
44. Act of March 26, 1895, ch. 70, § 2,1895 Neb. Laws. 270 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 46-103 (1984)).
45. I& (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-110 to -111 (1984)).
46. Id. §§ 3, 9 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-112 to -120 (1984)).
47. I& § 24 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-152 (1984)).
48. Id § 22 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-145 (1984)). Irrigation districts thus were
limited to supplying water solely for irrigation. Public power and irrigation dis-
[Vol. 66:8
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costs of developing an irrigation project may be issued if approved in a
special election.49
The irrigation district statutes provide powerful organizational and
financial tools to those wishing to develop irrigation projects. If the
election to organize a district is successful, the cost of organizing the
district is borne, not by the original promoters, but by the district.
Further, bonds may be issued, secured by the real estate within the
district, to finance irrigation project construction costs. While these
authorities facilitate irrigation project development, Nebraska has not
provided direct financial assistance to promote irrigation projects.50
However, financial assistance would be forthcoming from the federal
government.
The 1902 federal reclamation act 51 inaugurated the federal water
development program in the West. Receipts from the sale of public
lands in the sixteen reclamation states52 were credited to the "recla-
mation fund," the purpose of which was to construct and maintain "ir-
tricts, authorized in 1933, are authorized to provide power and to supply water for
irrigation. Act of April 18, 1933, ch. 86, § 3, 1933 Neb. Laws 339 (codified at NEB.
REv. STAT. § 70-604(1) (1981)). Reclamation districts, authorized in 1947, are au-
thorized to supply water for municipal, domestic, irrigation, power, milling, man-
ufacturing, mining, metallurgical, hunting, fishing, recreational development,
and other beneficial purposes. Act of June 11, 1947, ch. 173, § 13, 1947 Neb. Laws
535 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-541(9), § 46-541(14) (1984)). The current
practice for project promoters is to organize as a reclamation district.
49. Act of March 26, 1895, ch. 70, § 28, 1895 Neb. Laws 289 (codified at NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 46-144, 46-193 to -1,127 (1984)).
50. California did establish a state water development program including state con-
struction and operation of irrigation projects. R. DUNBAR, FORGING NEW RIGHTS
IN WESTERN WATERS 36-45 (1983). The federal government, through the Carey
Act of 1894, attempted to encourage Desert Land Act states to initiate state recla-
mation efforts. Carey Act, ch. 301, § 4, 28 Stat. 422 (current version at 43 U.S.C.
§ 641 (1982)). The act authorized states to apply for federal land grants of up to
one million acres of unclaimed desert land within their boundaries. States were
then to oversee the occupation, reclamation and irrigation of such land by home-
steaders. Twenty acres out of each 160 acre tract was to be put in cultivation
within 10 years. B. ANDREwS & M. SANSONE, supra note 39, at 170. Professor Sax
concludes, "The Carey Act, as expected, resulted in very little reclamation. It
was a demonstration of what was, by then, reasonably obvious-that large-scale
reclamation works were not a profitable enterprise." Sax, Federal Reclamation
Law, 2 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS 120 (R. Clark ed. 1967). That is, reclamation
projects could not profitably be undertaken by states or private entities.
51. Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (current version at 43 U.S.C.
§§ 372-498, 1457) (1982)) [hereinafter Reclamation Act]. For a brief discussion of
the historical background of the Reclamation Act see Sax, supra note 50, at 113-
21.
52. The 16 reclamation states designated in the 1902 Reclamation Act are Arizona,
California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyo-
ming. Reclamation Act, § 1 (current version at 43 U.S.C. § 391 (1982)). Texas was
added in 1906. Act of June 12, 1906, ch. 3288, 34 Stat. 259 (current version at 43
U.S.C. § 391 (1982)).
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rigation works for the storage, diversion, and development of waters
for the reclamation of arid and semiarid lands.. . ."53 The Secretary
of the Interior was authorized to construct those projects deemed fea-
sible without Congressional approval.54 Irrigators could water no
more than 160 acres with reclamation water.5 5 Irrigators receiving
reclamation water were required to repay construction costs without
interest in ten years.5 6 It was hoped that the reclamation fund would
be a revolving fund, based on receipts from the public land sales and
irrigator payment of construction costs, and that the reclamation pro-
gram would be financially self-contained.57 However, this hope was
not realized. The reclamation program was never financially self-sup-
porting, in part because irrigator's repayments were "greatly in
arrears."
5 8
The 1902 Reclamation Act was significant in that it established fi-
nancing (including federal subsidies) for western irrigation projects,59
creating the expectation that if irrigators wanted cheap irrigation
water the Bureau of Reclamation would try to accommodate them.
Without federal financial assistance it is unlikely that many western
irrigation projects would have been constructed. The initial justifica-
tion for the federal reclamation program was that it encouraged settle-
ment and agricultural development of an underdeveloped region. In
the 1930s, the reclamation program would receive greater federal
53. Reclamation Act (current version at 43 U.S.C. § 391 (1982)).
54. Id at § 4. Apparently project feasibility related to whether the payments from
irrigators would meet the project's estimated costs. I&L In 1910, Congress re-
stricted the Secretary's discretion to undertake reclamation projects by requiring
Presidential approval for reclamation projects. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 407, § 4,
36 Stat. 836 (current version at 43 U.S.C. § 413 (1982)). For a discussion of current
project initiation and authorization procedures, see Sax, supra note 50, at 136-47.
55. Reclamation Act of § 32 (repealed 1966). This antimonopoly provision is the con-
troversial excess land reclamation limitation. Sax, supra note 50, at 209-41. The
limitation was enlarged in 1982 to 960 acres. Reclamation Act of 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-293, § 204, 96 Stat. 1265, (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 390dd (1982)). See B. ANDREWS
& M. SAMsONE, supra note 39, at 177.
56. Reclamation Act, § 1 (current version at 43 U.S.C. § 391 (1982)).
57. Sax, supra note 50, at 122.
58. Id at 129-32. Congress advanced general revenues to the reclamation fund as
early as 1910. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 407, § 1, 36 Stat. 835, (codified as amended
at 43 U.S.C. § 397 (1982)). In the early 1970s the annual income from the reclama-
tion fund comprised approximately one third to one half of annual reclamation
expenditures. Sax, supra note 50, at 131.
59. With the enactment of the 1928 Boulder Canyon Project Act, Congress broadened
the scope of the Bureau of Reclamation's program to include multipurpose or
multi-objective projects, including flood control, hydropower generation, and rec-
reation, as well as irrigation. Ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928) (current version codified
at 43 U.S.C. §§ 617-617u (1982)). See B. ANDREws & M. SAMSONE, supra note 39,
at 180. While current Bureau projects are termed multipurpose projects, there is
some justification for considering them irrigation projects, as the other purposes
are ancillary to irrigation.
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funding as part of the public works policy the New Deal used to re-
lieve unemployment. However, after World War II agricultural sur-
pluses became a continuing problem, and federal subsidy of irrigation
projects was to come under increasing scrutiny. Ultimately federal
budget concerns would place federal funding for water projects into a
political limbo from which it has not yet completely emerged.
B. Drought, Depression, and Ground Water Development: 1930-1967
The drought and depression of the 1930s led to a significant in-
crease in the reclamation program,60 as New Dealers sought to reduce
unemployment through ambitious public works programs. The New
Deal also helped develop irrigation projects through non-reclamation
programs, such as the Public Works Administration and the Works
Progress Administration.61 The Tri-County project, Nebraska's larg-
est surface water project, was financed through the PWA.62
The Tri-County project led to numerous court challenges, one of
which significantly influenced the direction of Nebraska water devel-
opment and policy. In the famous Osterman decision, the Nebraska
Supreme Court ruled that the movement of water from one river ba-
sin to another violated Nebraska appropriation law.63 The suit was
filed by Tri-County project opponents, fearful of the downstream ef-
fects of the large project. The legal issue turned on the interpretation
of two conflicting statutes. Section 46-206, enacted in 1893,64 stated
that water could not be diverted for use in another river basin unless
the stream was over 100 feet wide, in which case no more than 75%
could be diverted into another basin. Section 46-265, enacted in 1895,65
stated that unused irrigation water must be returned to the stream
from which it was originally diverted, or to the Missouri river. This
latter statute was seized upon by the Osterman court to invalidate Tri-
60. During the 1930s, annual Bureau of Reclamation expenditures were sometimes
10 times the annual income of the reclamation fund. Sax, supra note 50, at 131.
61. HOLMES I, supra note 1, at 13, 15-16.
62. G. HANAMAKER, IRRIGATION PIONEERS: A HISTORY OF THE TRI-COUNTY PROJECT
TO 1935, at 204-09 (1964). The Tri-County Project, operated by the Central Ne-
braska Public Power and Irrigation District, includes Lake McConaughy, the
largest lake in Nebraska. For a discussion of the Tri-County system see Harns-
berger, Oeltjen & Fischer, Groundwater: From Windmills to Comprehensive
Public Management, 52 NEB. L. REV. 179, 284-92 (1973) [hereinafter Windmills].
63. Osterman v. Central Neb. Pub. Power and Irrigation Dist., 131 Neb. 356, 268 N.W.
334 (1936), overruled, Little Blue Natural Resources Dist. v. Lower Platte North
Natural Resources Dist., 206 Neb. 535, 294 N.W.2d 598 (1980). Regarding Oster-
man, see also Oeltjen, Harnsberger & Fischer, Interbasin Transfers: Nebraska
Law and Legend, 51 NEB. L. REV. 87, 104-07 (1971) [hereinafter Interbasin
Transfers].
64. 1893 Act § 3 (codified as amended at NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-206 (1984)).
65. 1895 Act § 59 (codified as amended at NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-265 (1984)).
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County's plan to use Platte River water to irrigate lands in the Platte,
Blue and Republican River basins.
The effect of Osterman was to reserve Platte River water to Platte
valley interests, at least temporarily. Irrigators from the Blue and Re-
publican River basins, the areas of the original Tri-County project
which were excised in Osterman, could not expect to obtain Platte
River water to supplement local water supplies. The decision proba-
bly kept Nebraska from obtaining federal reclamation funding it
otherwise might have obtained to use Platte River water in the Blue
and Republican basins. Conversely, the Osterman decision protected
"instream" water uses-such as ground water recharge, subirrigation,
and wildlife maintenance-as well as inbasin water development po-
tential, which otherwise may have been lost to out-of-basin
developments.
The devastating drought of the 1930s also led to the first surge of
ground water development in Nebraska. In 1935 alone over 1000 irri-
gation wells were drilled.66 In later decades ground water depletion
would give rise to demand for more irrigation projects as ground water
overtook surface water as the primary source of irrigation water in
Nebraska. The first significant ground water law development was
the 1933 Nebraska Supreme Court decision in Olson v. City of Wa-
hoo.67 In this well interference case, the court ruled that ground
water was not the private property of the landowner, that landowners
could use ground water on their land without waste, and that ground
water would be shared by competing users during periods of shortage.
The sharing principle was later embodied in the 1975 Ground Water
Management Act.
The major federal development of the 1940s was enactment of the
1944 Flood Control Act.68 The act adopted the Pick-Sloan plan to de-
velop the Missouri river basin for flood control, power generation, and
irrigation.69 The Pick-Sloan plan is significant to Nebraska water de-
velopment in that it created a special basin account for future water
projects in the Missouri River basin. Power revenues from hydroelec-
tric power plants associated with main-stem Missouri River reservoirs
would be used to subsidize irrigation projects in the Missouri River
basin.70
There were few notable state surface water law changes in the
66. Aiken, Nebraska Ground Water Law and Policy, 59 NEB. L. REV. 917, 944 (1980).
67. 124 Neb. 802, 248 N.W. 304 (1933). See Windmills, supra note 63, at 192-96.
68. Flood Control Act, ch. 665, 58 Stat. 887 (1944) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 701-1 et seq.
(1986)).
69. J. AuCOIN, WATER IN NEBRASKA 50-55 (1984). The book is a readable account of
Nebraska water history, policies and issues.
70. Id. at 57-59; Sax, supra note 50, at 135-36.
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1950s and 1960s. 71 However, significant changes occurred in Nebraska
ground water legislation. In the 1950s drought, combined with the de-
velopment of sprinkler irrigation systems, led to greater ground water
irrigation-in 1959 the number of acres irrigated from ground water
surpassed the number irrigated with surface water.7 2 With this in-
crease in ground water development came the first realization that de-
velopment could lead to depletion. This realization, plus increasing
ground water irrigation (strengthened by the boom in center pivot de-
velopment of the middle 1960s) 73 led to a steady stream of legislation,
beginning with the irrigation well registration,7 4 ground water prefer-
ences,7 5 and well spacing statutes76 of 1957. Concerns regarding
ground water depletion led to enacting ground water conservation dis-
trict (GWCD) statutes in 1959.7 7 Subsequent ground water legislation
71. However, in 1965 Congress enacted the federal Water Resources Planning Act,
Pub. L. No. 89-90, 79 Stat. 244 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1962 et seq. (1982)). A major
feature of the act was funding for state water planning programs to facilitate sur-
face water development; federal funds would be provided to the state to prepare
general water development plans for river basins or the state. Federal agencies
would then follow these state water plans in planning and designing particular
federal surface water projects. The purpose of these state water plans was to
reduce state-federal conflicts in federal water project development. The Reagan
administration ended state water planning program funding. Energy and Water
Development Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-88, 95 Stat. 1135 (1981).
In 1967 the Unicameral directed the Nebraska Soil and Water Conservation
Commission to utilize these federal water planning funds to prepare what is now
known as the Framework Study, a statewide assessment of water resources needs
and a guide to future development. The final Framework Study report was pre-
pared in 1971, which identified potential surface water development opportuni-
ties in Nebraska. NEB. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION COMM'N, REPORT ON THE
FRAMEWORK STUDY 121-30 (1971) [hereinafter FRAMEWoRK STUDY].
72. Aiken, supra note 66, at 948.
73. Id. at 951; AUcOIN, supra note 69, at 38-41.
74. Irrigation Well Registration Act, ch. 200, 1957 Neb. Laws. 701, 701-04 (1957) (codi-
fied at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-601 to -607 (1984)). See Aiken, supra note 66, at 949-
50; R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, supra note 7, at 230-31.
75. Groundwater Preference Act, ch. 199, 1957 Neb. Laws. 701 (1957) (codified at
NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613 (1984)). See Aiken, supra note 66, at 951; R. HARNs-
BERGER & N. THORSON, supra note 7, at 236-40.
76. Spacing of Irrigation Wells Act, ch. 201, 1957 Neb. Laws. 704 (1957) (codified as
amended at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-608 to -612 (1984)). See Aiken, supra note 66,
at 950; R. HARNSBERGER & THORSON, supra note 7, at 231-33.
77. Groundwater Conservation Act, ch. 220, 1959 Neb. Laws. 773-781 (1959) (codified
as amended at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-614 to -634 (1984)). See Aiken, supra note
67, at 950-51. The GWCDs were instrumental in developing public awareness
about improved irrigation practices, including irrigation scheduling, which helped
make a greater degree of ground water regulation politically more acceptable.
See id at 951 n.163. The § 46-664 irrigation runoff requirement of the Ground
Water Management Act probably stems from the runoff controls established and
enforced by the Blue River Association of GWCDs. GWCDs were subsequently
replaced by ground water control areas administered by Natural Resources Dis-
tricts. See id at 960-67.
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included well abandonment requirements to protect ground water
quality78 and authorization of municipal ground water transfers.79
In 1969 Nebraska adopted an important institutional innovation.
Twenty-four Natural Resources Districts, organized along river basin
boundaries, were established, replacing over a hundred single purpose
districts, primarily soil and water conservation districts.8 0 NRDs have
developed into effective and professional water development advo-
cates,8 1 and are in part responsible for the local control orientation of
Nebraska ground water depletion policies.
III. THE ENVIRONMENTAL REVOLUTION AND THE "NEW
FEDERALISM": 1968-1986
During its first 60 years the federal reclamation program was gen-
erally supported by other federal policies, most notably the federal
public works policies of the 1930s and post-World War II period.82
However, federal environmental and budgetary policy changes in the
1970s and 1980s would significantly conflict with the traditional recla-
mation program objectives. New state and federal environmental laws
78. Enactment of well abandonment statutes reflected the first realization that
ground water development could affect ground water quality. See Well Registra-
tion Act and Abandonment, ch. 230, 1961 Neb. Laws 683, 683-84 (1961) (codified as
amended at NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-602 (1984)). See Aiken, supra note 66 at 951; R.
HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, supra note 7, at 234-35.
79. The need for municipalities in and near the Platte River valley to import ground
water led to authorization of municipal ground water transfers in 1963. Munici-
pal Groundwater Transfers Act, ch. 276, 828, 828-32 (1963) 1963 Neb. Laws (codi-
fied as amended at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-638 to -650 (1984)). See R.
HARNSBERGER & N. THoRSON, supra note 7, at 241-44. Municipal representatives
pointed to the interrelationship between ground water withdrawals from the
Platte River alluvium and streamflow and the need to legally integrate surface
and ground water uses. However, ground water irrigators' fears that that their
uses would be subordinated to surface water appropriations under the priority
(first in time is first in right) doctrine prevented integrating ground and surface
water rights. Aiken, supra note 66, at 953-55.
80. Conservation of Natural Resources Act, L.B. 1357, 1969 Neb. Laws 99, 99-145
(1969) (codified as amended at NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-3201 to -3289 (1984)). See
Windmills, supra note 62, at 254-64.
81. One problem irrigation project promoters face is finding an effective local advo-
cate to promote the project at local, state, and federal levels. Generally irrigation
districts, public power districts, and reclamation districts could not afford to hire
a full-time advocate. With the creation of NRDs, water project promoters could
look to the permanent, full-time NRD staff to provide technical and advocacy
assistance. NRD managers fulfill this function for a wide range of resource devel-
opment projects, of which irrigation projects are the largest.
82. Economists feared that the U.S. economy would suffer a recession or depression
as federal war spending stopped at the end of the war. Thus federal public works
projects were seen as a mechanism for helping prevent this postwar bust. In fact,
postwar spending to rebuild Europe under the Marshall Plan helped maintain the
economic demand for American products and the postwar bust did not
materialize.
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required that the environmental consequences of proposed water
projects be evaluated, and that, in appropriate circumstances, projects
could not be constructed if they interfered with endangered wildlife
species or other environmental values. These environmental statutes
provided project opponents new means to challenge and delay water
projects. A federal study commission challenged many of the tradi-
tional justifications for reclamation projects, legitimizing political crit-
icism of previously sacrosanct water projects.
Perhaps most significantly, Presidents Carter and Reagan, on cost
and environmental grounds, have not proposed initiating any new rec-
lamation projects. New federal water project funding legislation re-
quires states to pay 35% of costs for U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
irrigation projects. While the shape of evolving federal policies regard-
ing financing reclamation projects are not yet clear, evidence suggests
that new reclamation projects will also require significant state and/or
local funding to qualify for federal cost-sharing assistance. This is in
dramatic contrast to prior federal policies, where the federal govern-
ment paid up to 90% of project costs. Federal and related state policies
were no longer directly supporting of the traditional reclamation pro-
gram mission, but instead were challenging that mission and the as-
sumptions upon which it was based. These policy changes required
new state policies regarding water projects in Nebraska.
A. Wild and Scenic Rivers Act
The first indication that federal policy towards reclamation was
changing was the enactment of federal environmental legislation to
protect environmental values often disrupted by water development
projects. The first act was the Wild and Scenic River Act of 1968.83
The intent of the act is to complement federal water impoundment
activities with one of preserving free-flowing rivers in their natural
state.8 4 The Act establishes a national system of protected riparian
environments by initially designating certain river reaches as compo-
nents of the system and by providing a mechanism by which other
river reaches may be added to the system.8 5 Additional rivers can be
brought into the system (1) by an act of Congress or (2) upon applica-
tion of the governor(s) of the concerned state(s) after approval by the
Secretary of the Interior and designation in a state program.8 6
83. Pub. L. 90-542, 82 Stat. 906 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-87 (1982)).
See Tarlock & Tippy, The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, 55 CORNELL L.
REV. 707 (1970); B. ANDREWs & M. SANSONE, supra note 39, at 121-24; Comment,
Federal Protection of Instream Values, 57 NEB. L. REV. 368, 393-94 (1978).
84. 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (1982).
85. Id. at § 1272. Fifty-five river segments currently included in the wild and scenic
river system are listed at 16 U.S.C. § 1274(a) (1982, Supp. III 1985).
86. Id. at § 1273(a) (1982). Ninety-one river segments identified for potential inclu-
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River segments are classified as a "wild river area," a "scenic river
area," or a "recreational river area," depending on the river area's
character.8 7 The Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agri-
culture are authorized to acquire up to 100 acres of land per mile on
both sides of rivers included in the system,88 giving the federal govern-
ment some control over future development of the river corridor.
More significantly, federal agencies are prohibited from authorizing,
assisting, or developing water impoundment projects within system
river components or in rivers which may be potentially included in the
system.8 9 Finally, system components are required to be managed by
federal agencies to preserve and enhance the values which led to in-
clusion in the wild and scenic rivers system.9 0
The Act's prohibition of impoundment in stream segments in-
cluded in the wild and scenic river system poses a significant threat to
water development. The Act allows project opponents to attempt to
have the river segment to be developed for impoundment included in
the wild and scenic river system or at least studied for possible inclu-
sion. Aware of this, whenever Nebraska stream segments have been
suggested by the state for study for inclusion in the system, the seg-
ments nominated have carefully excluded segments where potential
impoundment sites are located.91 Beyond this, the Act was the first
sion in the system are listed at 16 U.S.C. § 1276(a) (1982, Supp. III 1985). Several
states, excluding Nebraska, have adopted state wild and scenic river programs.
For a discussion of conflicts between state and federal scenic river programs, see
Fairfax, Andrews, & Buchsbaum, Federalism and the Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act Now You See 14 Now You Don't, 59 WASH. L. REV. 417 (1984). Nebraska
Senator Exon has introduced legislation that would include portions of the Nio-
brara River in the wild and scenic river system. S. 1713, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 131
CONG. REC. 124, 12317 (1985). See generally NEB. NATURAL REsOURcES COMM'N,
THE NIOBRARA RIVER: A PROPOSAL FOR SCENIC RIVER DESIGNATION (1986) (ex-
amines Exon's proposal to protect Niobrara as a scenic river).
87. 16 U.S.C. § 1273(b) (1982).
88. Id. at § 1277(a). Private land may be condemned. Id. at § 1277(b).
89. Id. at § 1278. This would include projects for which federal authorization was
required, such as under the federal 404 permit program, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982,
Supp. III 1985), as well as federally financed reclamation projects. Regarding the
404 program, see infra text accompanying notes 103-14.
90. 16 U.S.C. § 1281(a) (1982). The federal government may enter into a cooperative
agreement with a state or political subdivision to participate in administering the
river area. Id. at § 1281(e).
91. In the 1971 Framework Study, the Nebraska Soil and Water Conservation Com-
mission, now the Nebraska Natural Resources Commission, recommended the
Niobrara River, site of the controversial Norden Project, for potential designation
as a protected river "from its confluence with Antelope Creek downstream to the
headwaters of the proposed Norden Reservoir." FRAMEWORK STUDY, supra note
71, at 261. Similarly, the federal Platte Level B Study recommended for potential
designation as a protected river "the Calamus river above the recommended Cala-
mus Reservoir." MISSOURI RIVER BASIN COMM'N, REPORT ON THE PLATTE RIVER
BASIN, NEBRASKA LEVEL B STUDY 177 (1976) [hereinafter PLATTE LEVEL B
STUDY]. Nebraska has not adopted a state wild and scenic river or protected river
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forthright acknowledgement by Congress that water development and
environmental protection could clash, and that in some cases environ-
mental values should be protected even if water development was
thereby constrained.92
B. National Environmental Policy Act
The second federal statute enacted that has significantly impeded
the reclamation program is the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA).93 NEPA is the best known of the federal environmen-
tal statutes and has spawned the most litigation. NEPA requires fed-
eral agencies whose actions have significant environmental
consequences to publicly identify those consequences in a detailed en-
vironmental impact statement (EIS), to evaluate those consequences,
and to consider alternative courses of action with less environmental
disruption before taking final action.94 The EIS requirement is the
heart of NEPA, and has been used to require federal water develop-
ment agencies, however reluctantly,9 5 to more fully explore the envi-
ronmental consequences of the proposed water project and less
environmentally disruptive alternatives to that project. If an agency
fails to prepare an adequate environmental impact statement, the ade-
quacy of the statement can be challenged in court and the agency re-
system, even though both water planning studies recommended such a system.
FRAmwoRK STUDy, supra note 71, at 261 (Recommendation 9); PLATTE LEVEL B
STUDY, supra, at 176.
92. The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act was not the first federal statute dealing with the
environmental consequences of water development. The Fish and Wildlife Coor-
dination Act of 1934,16 U.S.C. §§ 661-666(c) (1982), provides "that wildlife conser-
vation shall receive equal consideration and be coordinated with other features of
water-resource development programs through the effectual and harmonious
planning, development, maintenance, and coordination of wildlife conservation
and rehabilitation." Id. at § 661. The act requires federal officials to confer with
state wildlife officials "with a view to the conservation of wildlife resources by
preventing loss of and damage to such resources" when a federal program or per-
mit is required for water diversion, impoundment, or channel modification. Id at
§ 662(a). See Guilbert, Wildlife Preservation Under Federal Law, in FEDERAL
ENViRONmENrAL LAw 550, 553-57 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974) Comment,
supra note 83, at 384-86.
93. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70a (1982)). See generally B. ANDREWS & M. SANSONE, supra
note 39, at 115-17; Anderson, The National Environmental Policy Act, in FED-
ERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 92, at 238-419; ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE
COURTS (1973); MacBeth, The National Environmental Policy Act After Five
Years, 2 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 1 (1975); Comment, supra note 83, at 381-82.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). Many states have enacted "little NEPAs" or
"SEPAs." Pridgeon, Anderson & Delphey, State Environmental Policy Acts: A
Survey ofRecent Developments, 2 HARV. ENvTL L. REv. 419 (1977). Nebraska has
not. Cf. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-1501 to -1532 (1986 Cum. Supp.).
95. See Cramton & Berg, On Leading a Horse to Water: NEPA and the Federal Bu-
reaucracy, 71 MICH. L. REv. 511 (1972).
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quired to prepare additional studies. NEPA does not require the
federal decision-maker to select the most environmentally sound al-
ternative, but rather to make a reasoned selection, considering the en-
vironmental consequences. 96
NEPA was used to contest construction of the proposed Norden
Dam on the Niobrara River in Save the Niobrara Ass'n v. Andrus.97
The Norden Dam litigation involved the Bureau of Reclamation
O'Neill Unit, which proposed to irrigate approximately 77,000 acres in
north central Nebraska from the water impounded by the Norden
Dam on the Niobrara River.98 The court ruled that the EIS prepared
by the Bureau failed to satisfactorily address the geologic stability of
the dam site, the ground water quality effects of the irrigation project,
the effect on wildlife, and project alternatives.99 The court enjoined
the project pending revision of the EIS.100 That ruling began a project
delay that has resulted in an evaluation of irrigation water supply al-
ternatives to the original impoundment proposal.lol
Save the Niobrara illustrates how NEPA provides water project
opponents with a better means to oppose projects on environmental
grounds than they traditionally have been afforded by state law.102
Save the Niobrara also is significant in that Norden is the first (and
only) Nebraska water project that has been significantly affected by
federal environmental law.
96. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978); Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v.
Karlen, 444 U.S. 223,227 (1980). In spite of the Supreme Court rulings that NEPA
is procedural rather than substantive, some federal agencies have nonetheless at-
tempted to minimize or obscure the adverse environmental impacts of their pro-
posed action, probably on the basis that opponents would use the EIS
identification of adverse environmental impacts to politically oppose the project.
This, of course, leaves the agency open to having the EIS deemed inadequate
when it is challenged in court.
97. 10 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1665 (D. Neb. 1977).
98. Id at 1666-67.
99. I& at 1670-72, 1678-80.
100. Id at 1681.
101. NEBRASKA DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, NEBRASKA STATE-LED O'NEILL UNIT
ALTERNATIVES STUDY (1985). The Niobrara river is now the subject of a proposed
federal scenic river designation. See supra note 86 and infra note 292.
102. The only opportunity available to Norden project opponents would have been
when the project's water rights were granted by the Nebraska Department of
Water Resources. At that time the only ground upon which the permit could
have been denied would have been if the proposed use of water was not benefi-
cial, or if the project was not in the public interest. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-204,
-229, -231, -234 (1984). Neither concept has been judicially defined in Nebraska.
See R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, supra note 7, at 78-79. However, now the
Water Management Board may review major water projects to determine
whether they should be modified to, among other things, accommodate environ-
mental objectives and/or competing water projects. See infra text accompanying
notes 285-97.
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C. Section 404 Dredge and Fill Permits
Section 404 of the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments (Clean Water Act)103 goes beyond the identification of
environmental impacts of proposed federal projects required under
NEPA. Section 404 requires public and private construction activities
in water bodies to meet water quality and environmental protection
criteria. The section 404 program is the first federal environmental
statute superimposing substantive constraints on federal water re-
sources projects.
Section 404 is only a part of the federal water pollution control pro-
gram. The 1972 Clean Water Act established a comprehensive na-
tional program of regulating discharges of pollutants into water from
point sources through NPDES permit requirements.10 4 States were
encouraged to assume administration of the federal NPDES water
quality program through federal program administration grants avail-
able to states with federally approved water pollution control
programs.J0 5
The section 404 program was designed to avoid overlap between
EPA's NPDES program and the Corps's permitting authority under
the Rivers and Harbors Act. 0 6 There is some irony in this fact, as the
Corps is better known as a water developer than as an environmental
regulator.OT The purpose of the section 404 program is to prevent en-
vironmental disruption resulting from the hydrologic modification of
water bodies, including streams (e.g. from stream channelization or
103. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982). See R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, supra note 7, at
204-08; Blumm, The Clean Water Act's Section 404 Permit Program Enters Its
Adolescence: An Institutional and Programmatic Perspective, 8 EcOLoGY L.Q.
409 (1980); Thompson, Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1977- Hydrologic Modification, Wetlands Protection and the
Physical Inteqrity of the Nation's Waters, 2 HARV. ENvTr, L. REv. 264 (1977).
104. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 et. seq. (1982). NPDES stands for the National Pollution Dis-
charge Elimination System. Id at § 1342. See R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON,
supra note 7, at 321-24.
105. 33 U.S.C. § 1256 (1982). See also id. § 1342. The Nebraska Department of Envi-
ronmental Control administers the NPDES program in Nebraska. NEB. ADMIN.
RULES & REGS. 119 (1980).
106. Section 9 of the Rivers and Harbors Act requires Congressional and Corps ap-
proval for the construction of any bridge, dam, dike, or causeway over or in any
navigable waters of the United States. 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1982). Section 10 of the
Rivers and Harbors Act requires a Corps permit for any obstruction placed in
navigable waters not specifically authorized by Congress. 1d. § 403. The tradi-
tional purpose of the Corps' §§ 9 and 10 permits is to prevent interference with
navigation. However, that purpose had been broadened to include environmental
considerations even prior to the Clean Water Act. See Kramon, Section Ten of the
Rivers and Harbors Act. The Emergence of a New Protection for Tidal Marshes,
33 MD. L. REv. 229 (1973); Thompson, supra note 103, at 267-71.
107. See generally B. ANDREWS & M. SANSONE, supra note 39, at 134-66 (overview of
the Corps' water development activities).
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impoundment).108 The scope of the section 404 program is very broad,
affecting virtually any construction in all waters of the United States,
rather than the traditional definition of navigable waters.109 As a re-
sult, section 404 permits are required for virtually any water project,
as they involve the placing of dredged or fill material into waters of
the United States.11o
Section 404 was amended in 1977 to exempt certain federal projects
from the permit requirement.1 '1 The exemption applies if (1) the pro-
ject is authorized by Congress, (2) the effects of the proposed dis-
charge are considered in an EIS, (3) the EIS is submitted to Congress
prior to the discharge, and (4) Congress, after receiving the EIS, subse-
quently either authorizes the project or appropriates funds for the
project.1 12 Legislative history indicates that Congress intended the
section 404(r) exemption to apply to projects "which are entirely
planned, financed, and constructed by a Federal agency in every re-
spect."llS Thus Bureau of Reclamation projects would not be ex-
108. See Thompson, supra note 103, at 264-67.
109. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Calloway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C.
1975) (Corps definition of "waters of the United States as traditionally navigable
waters invalidated as too narrow). See R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, supra
note 7, at 205; Thompson, supra note 103, at 273-75.
110. Technically a § 404 permit is not required to merely dredge or excavate material
from a water body so long as none is discharged back into the water body; a per-
mit is required only to place dredged or fill material therein. However, as
Thompson notes, "it is almost impossible to remove sediment or other material
from a stream without discharging part of it back into the water." Thompson,
supra note 103, at 272.
The Corps uses the § 404(b)(1) environmental guidelines adopted by the EPA
in determining whether a § 404 permit should be granted. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(1)
(1982). Technically the § 404 permit authorizes the discharge of dredged or fill
materials into a specified "disposal site" within waters of the United States. The
EPA Administrator is authorized, through the § 404(b)(1) environmental guide-
lines, to prohibit or restrict the discharge of dredged or fill materials into water
bodies if the discharge would have an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal
water supplies, shellfish beds, fishery areas, wildlife, or recreational areas. Id at
§ 1344(c). The objective of the guidelines is to maintain the ecological integrity of
the aquatic environment. 40 C.F.R. § 230.1a (1985).
111. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1605 (codified at 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344(r) (1982)). See Thompson, supra note 103, at 271-86. The 1977 amend-
ments also authorized "general permits" to administratively exempt categories of
dredge and fill activities from permit requirements, to exempt certain agricul-
tural practices from permit requirements, and to authorize state administration
of the § 404 program. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e), (f), (g)-(k) (1982).
112. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(r) (1982). The § 404(r) exemption process was no doubt a reac-
tion to the TVA v. Hill endangered species case, in which the TVA unsuccessfully
argued that its identification of endangered species destruction in its EIS and the
subsequent appropriation by Congress of construction funds constituted a Con-
gressional ratification of the project and acquiescence to the effects on endan-
gered species. See infra text accompanying notes 120-38.
113. 123 CONG. REC. S19,654 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1977) (floor statement of Sen. Stafford).
See Thompson, supra note 103, at 284-86.
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empted because state and/or local financing is required.
Section 404 was a profound legal development because it began to
interject environmental values into federal public works policies. Sec-
tion 404 is the first federal environmental law establishing what has
been referred to as "regulatory property rights."1l4 By establishing a
program to administratively protect aquatic environmental values, the
section 404 program effectively creates and preserves public property
rights in those aquatic environments.
D. Endangered Species Act
The 1973 Act. The second federal environmental statute establish-
ing "regulatory property rights" is the Federal Endangered Species
Act of 1973 (FESA), which affirmatively requires federal agencies to
refrain from taking action that would harm endangered species or
their critical habitat.'1 5 While earlier federal endangered species stat-
utes dealt primarily with the hunting and taking of endangered spe-
cies, 116 the 1973 FESA recognized that the destruction of natural
habitat was a greater threat to endangered species than hunting.1i7
Thus a major focus of the FESA was protection of habitat critical to
the continued existence of federally designated threatened or endan-
gered wildlife species. This feature of the FESA established regula-
tory property rights in critical habitat of endangered and threatened
species which would conflict with implementing federal water devel-
opment projects.
The most important provision of the FESA relative to federal
water projects is the section 7 interagency cooperation require-
ments.11 8 Section 7 imposes on federal agencies a consultation re-
quirement and an independent requirement to refrain from taking
actions harming listed species or their critical habitat. The species and
habitat protection requirements take precedence over the federal
agency's primary mission."Z9
114. Tarlock, The Endangered Species Act and Western Water Rights, 20 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 1, 3 (1985).
115. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983); B. ANDREWS & M. SANSONE, supra
note 39, at 118-21; Coggins, Conserving Wildlife Resources, An Overview of the
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 51 N.D.L. REv. 315 (1975); Comment, supra note
83, at 389-92.
116. B. ANDREWs & M. SANSONE, supra note 39, at 118-19; Coggins, Federal Wildlife
Law Achieves Adolescence: Developments in the 1970s, 1978 DuKE L.J. 753 (1978).
117. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 179 (1978).
118. Pub. L. 93-205 § 7, 87 Stat. 892 (currently codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(a) (1982)) (emphasis added).
119. The 1969 Endangered Species Act authorized federal agencies to preserve the
habitat of endangered species on federal lands under their jurisdiction only inso-
far as it was practicable and consistent with the agency's primary mission. En-
dangered Species Act of 1969, Pub. L. 89-669, § 1(b), 80 Stat. 926. The bills
introduced to amend the 1969 act originally had the same practicability considera-
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Section 7 (1) requires federal agencies to consult with the Interior
Department (in fact the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service) to determine
whether proposed agency action would harm threatened or endan-
gered species or their critical habitat, and (2) further prohibits federal
agencies from taking actions harming threatened or endangered spe-
cies or their habitat. The section 7 consultation requirement provides
substantial legal protection to endangered or threatened species and to
their associated habitat. In the 1973 act this legal protection was abso-
lute: there was no procedure for granting waivers or exemptions, and
no procedure for evaluating the costs and benefits of the proposed fed-
eral action relative to endangered species conservation. Thus, if a pro-
posed water project would violate section 7, the project would have to
be modified to accommodate threatened or endangered species and/or
their critical habitat or else not be constructed. However, this endan-
gered species preservation policy was significantly amended in 1978 in
the wake of the 1977 U.S. Supreme Court TVA v. Hill opinion. The
case applied section 7 to stop completion of a major federal water pro-
ject, the Tellico dam and reservoir, that was nearly completed.
TVA v. Hill. The major Supreme Court opinion interpreting the
1973 FESA was TVA v. Hill,12o the Tellico dam controversy involving
the three inch snail darter fish. The issues, as stated by the Court,
were whether the FESA applied retroactively to a project that was
nearly completed, and whether continued congressional appropria-
tions for the Tellico dam constituted an implied repeal of FESA re-
garding Tellico.121
Tellico dam was constructed on the Little Tennessee River by the
TVA to impound water by flooding 16,500 acres for shoreline develop-
ment, power, flood control, and recreational purposes.12 2 Construction
was originally authorized in 1967, and Congress continued to appropri-
ate money for the project up to the time of the Supreme Court deci-
tions and were consistent with primary purpose limitations. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153, 181 (1978). However, these restrictions were eliminated from the final bill in
conference. Id. at 182.
Section 9 is the takings provision of the FESA. Section 9 prohibits virtually all
importing, exporting, taking, possession, selling, delivery, transportation or ship-
ping of listed species. 16 U.S.C. § 1537 (1982). To take a listed species is defined as
"to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or
attempt to engage in any such conduct." Id, at § 1532(19). Thus, each time an
endangered species were killed by a water project, for example, a taking would
occur. See Tarlock, supra note 114, at 9. See also 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B) (1982),
discussed infra note 185.
120. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). See Comment, Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978:
A Congressional Response to Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 5 COLUM. J.
ENVTL L. 283 (1979).
121. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 156 (1978).
122. Id, at 157.
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sion.123 The project had been delayed approximately two years
through NEPA litigation. 2 4 Shortly before the NEPA injunction was
dissolved, a new species of perch, the snail darter, was discovered in
the Little Tennessee River.125 On October 8, 1975, the snail darter was
formally listed as an endangered species. 2 6 In the designation, the
Secretary noted that the snail darter lives only in that portion of the
Little Tennessee River that would be innundated by Tellico. 27 Subse-
quently, the Secretary designated that portion of the Little Tennessee
River as critical habitat for the snail darter.2 8 Negotiations between
the Fish and Wildlife Service and the TVA were of no avail, and litiga-
tion under the FESA was initiated.2 9
The district court found that closure of the Tellico Dam would ad-
versely modify, if not completely destroy, the snail darter's critical
habitat, jeopardizing the continued existence of the species.' 30 None-
theless the court refused to enjoin completion of the project, because
of continuing congressional appropriations, and because of the loss of
federal expenditures for the dam.1S1 The court of appeals reversed,
interpreting section 7 as prohibiting completion of the dam if it jeop-
ardized endangered species or their habitat.32 The court concluded
that Tellico could be completed only if Congress legislatively ex-
empted the project from the FESA, if the snail darter were removed
from endangered species status, or if the snail darter's critical habitat
were redefined to exclude the dam site.
Chief Justice Burger, for a divided Court, began the analysis of the
issues with a review of the legislative history of the act, and concluded
that Congress intended to afford endangered species protection the
highest of governmental priorities.133 The Court noted the 1973 FESA
went beyond prior federal endangered species legislation by deleting
language that would require federal agencies to protect endangered
species only insofar as it were practicable and did not conflict with the
primary mission of the agency.134 In doing so, Congress indicated its
123. I& at 158.
124. See Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 371 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Tenn. 1973),
affd, 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974); Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 339 F.
Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn. 1972), qffid, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972).
125. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 153, 158-59 (1978).
126. 40 Fed. Reg. 47005-06 (1976); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 160-61 (1978).
127. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 161 (1978).
128. 41 Fed. Reg. 13925-28 (1976); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 162 (1978).
129. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 162-65 (1978).
130. Hill v. TVA, 419 F. Supp. 753, 756-57 (E.D. Tenn. 1976). See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153, 165-66 (1978).
131. Hill v. TVA, 419 F. Supp. at 753, 758-60. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 166-67
(1978).
132. Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977). See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,168 (1978).
133. TVA v. Hfll, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978).
134. ML at 180-82.
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belief that the value of the genetic material of even a single species is
virtually incalculable, and that endangered species protection should
override an agency's primary mission.135 Against this legislative back-
ground, the Court found that Congress intended the FESA to be retro-
active and that it be enforced even if ongoing projects were thereby
stopped.S36 The Court also determined that continued appropriations
for Tellico did not exempt it from FESA's provisions,137 and that com-
pletion of the dam therefor should be enjoined.138
Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Administration. A second
FESA decision Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Administration,139
influenced Congressional deliberations on the 1978 FESA amend-
ments.140 It was the first Nebraska water project lawsuit based on the
FESA, foreshadowing what would happen under state endangered
species statutes in Little Blue I.
The issue was the effect of the proposed Grayrocks dam and reser-
voir on North Platte River flows from Wyoming into Nebraska.
Grayrocks would impound approximately 104,000 acre feet of water,' 4 '
and is part of the Laramie River Station, a three unit 1500 megawatt
coal-fired electric generating station located on the Laramie river near
135. Id. at 178. The Court quoted from H.R. Rep. No. 93-412, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 4-5
(1973).
From the most narrow possible point of view, it is in the best interests
of mankind to minimize the losses of genetic variation. The reason is
simple: they are potential resources. They are keys to puzzles which we
cannot solve, and may provide answers to questions which we have not
yet learned to ask.
To take a homely, but apt, example: one of the critical chemicals in
the regulation of ovulations in humans was found in a common plant.
Once discovered, and analyzed, humans could duplicate it synthetically,
but had it never existed--or had it been driven out of existence before
we knew its potentialities-we would never have tried to synthesize it in
the first place.
Who knows, or can say, what potential cures for cancer or other
scourges, present or future, may lie locked up in the structures of plants
which may yet be undiscovered, much less analyzed? ... Sheer self-inter-
est impels us to be cautious.
TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 178 (1978) (emphasis in original).
136. Id. at 185-88.
137. Id. at 189-93.
138. Id. at 193-95. Justices Powell, Blackmun and Rehnquist dissented.
139. Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 12 ENV'T REP. CAS. (BNA) 1156 (D.
Neb. 1978).
140. The Tellico and Grayrocks dams, were the first two projects to be evaluated for
critical habitat protection exemptions under the 1978 amendments. Endangered
Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 5(i), 92 Stat. 3751, 3761.
141. Letter from Lynn A Greenwalt, Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to Lt.
Gen. John W. Morris, Chief, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 4 (December 8, 1978)
(discussing effects of Grayrocks on Central Platte critical crane habitat) [herein-
after Grayrocks Biological Opinion].
An acre foot of water is enough water to cover an acre of land to a depth of
one foot, or 325,851 gallons. R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, supra note 7, at 7.
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Wheatland, Wyoming. 42 The Laramie River Station is part of the
Missouri Basin Power Project, a joint regional power supply project of
six consumer-owned electric systems, then including the Lincoln Elec-
tric System. The project manager is Basin Electric Power Coopera-
tive. Project financing was based on Rural Electrification
Administration (REA) loan guarantees.
The Laramie River is the major tributary to the North Platte River
in Wyoming, contributing approximately seventeen percent of its an-
nual flow at the Nebraska-Wyoming border.143 The power project
alone would have reduced flows into Nebraska by approximately
23,000 acre feet of water per year.144 An additional 22,500 acre feet of
water from Grayrocks was to be allocated to the proposed Corn Creek
irrigation project.145 The North Platte River was allocated by Ne-
braska v. Wyoming,146 in which a divided Court granted Nebraska
seventy-five percent of the river flow. The allocation of the Laramie
River, however, is subject to some dispute.147 The flow reductions
from Grayrocks would most directly have affected water storage in
Lake McConaughy for irrigation and power production purposes. The
flow reductions also had the potential to impact whooping crane
habitat designated critical by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)
in the Central Platte river region. 48 The Central Nebraska Public
Power and Irrigation District (Tri-County), which owns and operates
Lake McConaughy, sought to have the Nebraska Attorney General
challenge Grayrocks for violating the North Platte River decree of Ne-
braska v. Wyoming.149 When Nebraska did file suit, however, it al-
142. Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 12 ENV'T. REP. CAS. (BNA) 1156, 1157
(D. Neb. 1978).
143. Id. at 1161.
144. Grayrocks Biological Opinion, supra note 141, at 12.
145. Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 12 ENV'T. RaP. CAS. (BNA) at 1156,
1164 (D. Neb. 1978).
146. 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
147. Professor Tarlock suggests that the Laramie River was not affected by the Ne-
braska v. Wyoming decree because the Laramie had been apportioned between
Colorado and Wyoming in Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922). Tarlock,
supra note 114, at 20 n.97. Nebraska irrigation interests are not yet willing to
concede that, however.
148. On May 15, 1978, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior,
designated the "Platte River bottoms" from Lexington to Shelton as critical
habitat for the endangered Whooping Crane. 43 Fed. Reg. 20,938, 20,941 (1978)
(codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.95(b) (1985)). The Platte River bottoms are defined as
the Platte River channel and immediately adjacent wetlands. Id. at 20,938. The
designation is in the heart of the Platte River, where several proposed water de-
velopment projects would either divert or impound water for irrigation. The
Central Platte critical habitat designation would later drive the legal and political
impasse over Platte River water projects leading to LB 1106.
149. The author attended a dinner sponsored by Tri-County some months prior to the
filing of the case. At the dinner, Tri-County officials lobbied the Attorney Gen-
eral's office to file suit but not on NEPA or FESA grounds. Tri-County, being in
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leged NEPA and FESA violations.
The suit sought to enjoin construction of Grayrocks by Basin Elec-
tric, alleging that the REA had violated NEPA and FESA in (1) failing
to consider the project's environmental impacts in making loan guar-
antees of approximately $120 million,150 and (2) in failing to insure
that critical habitat was not jeopardized as required by section 7 of
FESA. The suit also alleged that the Army Corps of Engineers had
similarly failed to consider the project's environmental impacts in Ne-
braska and had similarly failed to insure that critical habitat in Ne-
braska was not jeopardized when the Corps granted a section 404
dredge and fill permit.15 ' Nebraska was joined in its suit by national
wildlife groups and their local affiliates, which significantly affected
the terms of the settlement.15 2
The court ruled that the REA's EIS was deficient and should have
included an evaluation of (1) the possible impacts of Grayrocks on
downstream fish and wildlife habitat,153 (2) the effect of other pro-
posed water depletions,15 4 (3) the effect of project ground water
the electricity generation business itself, did not oppose the power project as such
although it would have preferred that project evaporation be reduced thorough
nonevaporative water cooling methods. See Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Ad-
min., 12 ENV'T REP. CAs. (BNA) 1156, 1164 (D. Neb. 1978). Tri-County did oppose
Basin Electric's agreement to provide water from Grayrocks to Corn Creek.
There was general agreement that the suit was necessary to protect Nebraska
irrigation interests. Environmental concerns were never considered. Water avail-
ability from the North Platte River for endangered species in the Central Platte
region (see supra note 149, regarding the Central Platte critical habitat designa-
tion) would be little affected by developments upstream from McConaughy.
However, Tri-County officials were strongly opposed to the suit's being filed on
environmental grounds, realizing that any environmental allegations made
against Grayrocks could be made just as easily (indeed, with greater justification)
against pending Nebraska Platte River water projects. The Attorney General,
however, realized that litigation under the Supreme Court decree would be very
difficult and uncertain, and properly elected to file suit on NEPA and FESA vio-
lations. Accord Tarlock, supra note 114, at 20.
150. Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 12 ENV'T REP. CAS. (BNA) 1156, 1159
(D. Neb. 1978), appeal vacated & dismissed, 594 F.2d 870 (8th Cir. 1979).
151. Id. at 1157. Separate proceedings against the REA and the Corps were consoli-
dated in a single proceeding. Id.
152. Id. at 1157. The national wildlife groups were the National Audubon Society, the
National Wildlife Federation, and the Nebraska Wildlife Federation. AGREE-
MENT OF SETTLEMENT AND COMPROMISE 12 (December 4, 1978) [hereinafter
SETTLEMENT].
153. Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 12 ENV'T REP. CAs. (BNA) 1156, 1161-
63 (D. Neb. 1978). The EIS had stopped measuring environmental impacts at the
Nebraska-Wyoming border.
154. 1d. at 1164-65. The court ruled that NEPA requires a consideration of the cumu-
lative effect of the proposed action in light of other geographically and environ-
mentally related actions, citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 409-10, 413
(1976). Corn Creek, the federally authorized Narrows irrigation project on the
South Platte River in Colorado, and agricultural ground water pumping in Ne-
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pumping in Wyoming,.5 5 and (4) the effect of flow reductions on the
fisheries downstream from McConaughy, Platte River ground water
recharge, and Nebraska surface water irrigators. 5 6 The court also
ruled that the EIS prepared by the Corps was similarly deficient. 57
Regarding endangered species, the court ruled that the REA
should have consulted with the FWS.1 58 FWS had sought consultation
with REA, but the agency declined on the basis that REA itself had
concluded that there were no adverse impacts on downstream critical
habitat or endangered species.159 FWS then issued its jeopardy opin-
ion,160 stating that Grayrocks would jeopardize the continued exist-
ence of the whooping crane by destroying or adversely modifying its
critical habitat, and indicated that further studies would be needed.' 6 '
braska's Platte River valley were determined to be necessary considerations in
the EIS. Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 12 ENV'T REP. CAS. (BNA)
1156, 1164-65 (D. Neb. 1978).
155. Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 12 ENV'T REP. CAS. 1156, 1167-68 (D.
Neb. 1978).
156. I& at 1169.
157. i& at 1180.
158. Id. at 1169-71.
159. Regarding the propriety of the REA's making its own determination of no jeop-
ardy, the court stated,
As to the first point-that REA was justified in concluding that no
adverse impact on the habitat had been demonstrated at the time of the
making of the [loan guarantee commitments]-the difficulty is that the
Endangered Species Act places the burden upon the agencies who are
authorizing, funding, or carrying out programs to insure that those pro-
grams do not jeopardize endangered species or the habitat of the species.
The burden is not upon someone else to demonstrate that there will be
an adverse impact. It may well be true that REA was justified in con-
cluding that no adverse impact has been demonstrated, but the question
is whether it has met its burden of insuring that there will be no jeop-
ardy. Unless REA has done that, it has not complied with the Act. That
is true, even though the whooping crane issue was first raised well after
many of the plans had been made and a great deal of money already
spent. This is one of the principal teachings of Tennessee Valley Author-
ity v. Hill....
Id at 1171 (emphasis in original).
160. Under the 1978 amendments, the opinion of a Secretary is the result of the FWS
interagency consultation, stating FWS's conclusions regarding the effects of the
proposed agency action on endangered species and their habitat. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(b) (1982). See infra text accompanying notes 175-77. If the biological opin-
ion concludes that the proposed agency action will jeopardize the continued exist-
ence of endangered species and their habitat the opinion is often referred to as a
jeopardy opinion.
161. Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 12 ENV'T REP. CAs. (BNA) 1156, 1170
(D. Neb. 1978). After the Grayrocks decision the Corps requested consultation
with FWS. Grayrocks Biological Opinion, supra note 141, at 1. The FWS reiter-
ated its earlier conclusion that Grayrocks would jeopardize the continued exist-
ence of the whooping crane by destroying or adversely modifying its critical
habitat. FWS proposed two alternatives that would avoid jeopardy: that Basin
Electric either (1) replace the water removed from the Laramie River at the ap-
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The court also ruled that REA (and the Corps) had a duty under sec-
tion 7 of FESA to insure endangered species or their critical habitat
would not be jeopardized.162 Finally, the court determined that REA
had violated FWS regulations prohibiting an irreversible or irretriev-
able commitment of federal resources. The action of REA foreclosed
consideration of modifications or alternatives to the proposed agency
action before FWS consultation was completed and a biological opin-
ion could be issued.163 The court also determined that the Corps had
violated the same FESA requirements.164 The court set aside the
REA loan guarantees and the Corps' section 404 permit as unlawful.165
With the adverse ruling, Basin Electric was faced with the prospect
of having to prepare a new EIS, taking the potential effect of
Grayrocks on the downstream critical habitat into consideration. 166
As this would have taken several months, if not years, especially if the
adequacy of the new EIS were litigated, Basin elected to settle the
case. The settlement had to satisfy both the Nebraska irrigation inter-
ests responsible for initiating the suit and the wildlife interests that
had joined the suit. It also had to take into account the 1978 FESA
Amendments, to which we now turn.167
1978 Amendments. The Tellico decision led to a public outcry that
the FESA valued a three inch fish above a $120 million dam represent-
ing economic progress. 68 Congressional reactions were grouped in
three camps: (1) retaining the FESA as interpreted in TVA v. Hill
with no amendment, (2) amending the FESA to exempt projects
which were significantly under way when the FESA was adopted, or
(3) develop a method for conflict resolution on a case by case
method.169 The latter view prevailed and resulted in the 1978 FESA
proximate time the water was being removed, or (2) establish a trust for the
maintenance and improvement of whooping crane habitat on the Platte River.
Id at 18.
162. Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 12 ENV'T REP. CAS. (BNA) 1156, 1171-
72 (D. Neb. 1978).
163. 1& at 1172.
164. Ic at 1172-73. The court determined that the issuance of the § 404 permit was
premature; the Corps failed to consider the environmental effects of other water
depletions (Corn Creek, Narrows, and Nebraska groundwater pumping), poten-
tial damage to the Lake McConaughy trout fishery, and the effects of reduced
North Platte River flows on Nebraska ground water resources and Nebraska ag-
ricultural activities. Id at 1175-77.
165. Id at 1180-81.
166. It is common practice for the applicant for a federal permit, license, funding, etc.
to prepare a draft EIS itself which is then presented to the agency responsible for
preparing the EIS. The circuits are divided on whether this practice is acceptable.
See Fisher, The CEQ Regulations: New Stage in the Evolution of NEPA, 3 HARV.
ENvTL L. REV. 347, 369-70 (1979).
167. The Grayrocks settlement is discussed infra text accompanying notes 193-95.
168. Comment, supra note 120, at 298.
169. Id at 299.
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amendments.170
The most important change made by the 1978 amendments was the
exemption procedure added to section 7. Under the 1973 act, section 7
required federal agencies to consult with the Interior Secretary re-
garding the potential impacts of agency action on listed species or
their critical habitat, and to then insure that the agency's action did
not jeopardize listed species or their critical habitat.171 The section 7
consultation requirement, now denominated section 7(a), reads:
Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the
Secretary, insure that any action authorized, funded or carried out by such
agency (hereinafter referred to in this section as an "agency action") is not
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of
habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary, after consulta-
tion as appropriate with affected States, to be critical, unless such agency has
been granted an exemption for such action by the [Endangered Species] Com-
mittee pursuant to subsection (h) of this section.1 7 2
The only major changes in the section 7(a) consultation requirement,
aside from the exemption possibility and additional consultation pro-
cedures, are the definition of agency action and the clarification that
only adverse habitat modifications need be prevented. Thus the basic
duties to consult and to insure no jeopardy were preserved in the 1978
amendments.
The consultation procedure was expanded and formalized in the
1978 amendments. Consultation must be concluded within ninety
days, and the Secretary must issue a "Secretary's opinion" stating the
Secretary's position and summarizing the information upon which it is
based, detailing how the proposed agency action would affect the spe-
cies or its habitat.173 The Secretary must also suggest any "reasonable
and prudent alternatives" that the Secretary believes would avoid
jeopardy.174 Federal agencies are prohibited from making irreversible
resource commitments foreclosing implementation of any prudent al-
170. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751
(1978) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1532-36, 1538-40, 1542 (1982 & Supp. I
1983)). For a discussion of the legislative debate over the 1978 amendments, see
Comment supra note 120, at 299-309.
The 1978 amendments defined critical habitat which had not been previously
defined, and required the Interior Secretary to identify critical habitat when pro-
posing to list endangered species. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(5), 1533(a) (1978). In 1982,
the current cost-benefit requirement for critical habitat designation was added.
Critical habitat designations must take into account the economic impact and
other relevant impacts of the habitat designation. Id. at § 1533(b)(4). The Secre-
tary may exclude an area from critical habitat designation if the benefits of exclu-
sion outweigh the benefits of listing unless the best available scientific and
commercial data indicate that exclusion will result in species extinction. Id
171. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976).
172. Id at § 1536(a)(2).
173. Id. § 1536(b).
174. 1d.
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ternatives which would avoid jeopardy.175
Exemptions may be obtained for jeopardy agency actions for which
there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives, if the agency action
benefits clearly outweigh the jeopardy caused, the agency action is in
the public interest and of regional or national significance, and the
jeopardy can be mitigated.176 Agencies, governors of states in which
the proposed agency action would occur, or permit or license appli-
cants may apply for an exemption if consultation indicates that jeop-
ardy may occur.177 The exemption application is initially considered
by a review committee, with the final determination being made by
the Endangered Species Committee. 7 8
The review board is composed of three individuals: one appointed
by Interior Secretary, one state representative appointed by the Presi-
dent based upon gubernatorial nominations, and one administrative
law judge.179 The board reviews the exemption application and re-
ports its findings to the Committee.18 0 The board must determine by a
majority vote (1) whether the proposed action would jeopardize en-
dangered species or their habitat, and (2) whether such exemption ap-
plicant has acted in good faith in attempting to comply with
endangered species requirements.' 8 ' If the board determines that
these criteria are met, it submits a report to the Committee discussing
available alternatives, whether the proposed agency action is in the
public interest and of national or regional significance, and proposed
mitigation and enhancement measures. 8 2
The Endangered Species Committee makes a final decision on the
exemption application with ninety days of receiving the review board
report. 8 3 The Committee is composed of seven members: the Secre-
tary of Agriculture, the Secretary of the Army, the Chairman of the
Council of Economic Advisors, the EPA Administrator, the Secretary
of the Interior, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion, and a state representative appointed by the president based on
175. I& § 1536(b), (d). This provision codified the earlier FWS endangered species reg-
ulations enforced by the court in Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 12
ENV'T REP. CAs.(BNA) 1156 (D. Neb. 1978).
176. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1) (1982).
177. Id. § 1536(g)(1). The application must state the reasons why the applicant be-
lieves it would qualify for an exemption. Id. at § 1536(g)(2)(A). Any federal
agency applying for an exemption must in its application include a statement
describing why the proposed agency action cannot be altered or modified to avoid
jeopardy. Id. at § 1536(f).
178. I& § 1536(g)(1).
179. Id. § 1536(g)(3)(A)(i)-(iii).
180. Id- § 1536(g)(3)(A).
181. Id. § 1536(g)(5).
182. Id. § 1536(g)(6)-(7).
183. Id. § 1536(h)(1).
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gubernatorial nominations.18 4 The Committee must grant an exemp-
tion if, with at least five members voting, it determines that (1) there
are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency action,
(2) the benefits of the agency action clearly outweigh the benefits of
alternative courses of action avoiding jeopardy, and the action is in the
public interest, (3) the action is of regional or national significance,
and (4) the Committee establishes mitigation requirements to mini-
mize jeopardy 8 5
In addition to the general exemption procedure, the 1978 amend-
ments required the Committee to conduct an expedited consideration
of exemptions for Tellico and Grayrocks within ninety days of the
Act's effective date. Project exemptions would be granted if there
were no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the projects, if the pro-
ject benefits clearly outweighed alternative courses of actions avoiding
jeopardy, and if the projects were in the public interest. 86
TeZlico. The Committee unanimously rejected the Tellico exemp-
tion application. 8 7 The Committee concluded that there was a rea-
sonable and prudent alternative to the agency action and that the
benefits of the proposed agency action did not clearly outweigh the
benefits of alternative actions avoiding jeopardy.8s The Committee
determined that the benefits from not completing the dam and reser-
voir were greater than those from completing Tellico.S 9 Congress
subsequently exempted Tellico from FESA and "any other law"
prohibiting its construction.1 9 0
184. Ia § 1536(e)(3).
185. Id. at § 1536(h)(1). Any exemptions granted are permanent exemptions if a bio-
logical assessment has been conducted, unless the Secretary determines that the
exemption will result in extinction of a species not identified in the biological
assessment. Id. at § 1536(h)(2)(A)-(B). If so, the Committee has 30 days within
which to grant the exemption notwithstanding the exemption finding. Id. at
1536(h)(2)(B). Any takings of endangered or threatened species that occur pur-
suant to an exempted action are not considered takings under the FESA. Idat
§ 1536(o). Incidental takings were authorized by the 1982 amendments if ap-
proved by the Secretary. Id. at § 1539(a)(2) (B). The 1978 amendments also ad-
ded a self-defense exception to the takings prohibition. Id. at § 1540(a)(3), (b)(3).
186. Id. Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 5, 92 Stat. 3761. The requirements for the Tellico and
Grayrocks exemptions were the same as for exemptions generally except that the
regional and national significance and mitigation requirements were waived.
However, the amendments imposed a no jeopardy requirement on the Missouri
Basin Power Project (i.e., Grayrocks) should jeopardy be indicated in a biological
opinion. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 5, 92
Stat. 3761 (1982).
187. ENDANGERED SPECIES COMMITTEE, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, APPLICATION FOR EX-
EMPTION FOR TELLICO DAm AND RESERVOIR PROJECT 1, 4 (1979).
188. Id. at 2.
189. Id. at 2-4.
190. Energy and Water Development Appropriation of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-69, 93 Stat.
449 (1979). See Goplerud, The Endangered Species Act: Does It Jeopardize the
Continued Existence of Species?, 1979 ARiz. ST. L.J. 487, 507.
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Grayrocks. After conclusion of the Grayrocks litigation the parties
elected to seek a settlement. Principal terms of the settlement were
(1) agreeing to reduce project water consumption principally to satisfy
Nebraska irrigation interests (represented by the state of Ne-
braska)191 and (2) to establish the $7.5 million Platte River Whooping
Crane Habitat Maintenance Trust.192 The Endangered Species Com-
mittee granted the project an exemption, stipulating that the mitiga-
tion requirements contained in the settlement agreement be
implemented. 193
The FESA established, in effect, regulatory water rights for endan-
gered species and their habitat to which federal water projects were
subject. FESA litigation delayed at least two federal major water
projects, forcing significant environmental concessions in Grayrocks.
Grayrocks, in addition to the earlier Norden dam decision, sent a col-
lective shiver through Nebraska irrigation interests. Prior to these de-
cisions, Nebraska water developers had enjoyed the belief that federal
environmental restrictions would not affect their water projects. Nor-
den and Grayrocks proved conclusively that this belief was wrong.
The FESA was to play another crucial role in Nebraska water poli-
tics. A state endangered species act, enacted to qualify for federal en-
dangered species program funding, would contain a consultation/no-
jeopardy requirement very similar to FESA's section 7.194 The state
consultation/no-jeopardy requirement would temporarily derail all
Platte River water projects, creating one of the major political pres-
sures leading to LB 1106.
E. Water Policies for the Future
While federal environmental legislation was creating legal road-
191. SETTLEMENT, supra note 152, at 4.
192. Id The primary purpose of the trust is to protect and maintain the Central Platte
critical habitat. The Platte River Whooping Crane Habitat Maintenance Trust
Declaration 2 (Dec. 4, 1978). The trustees are authorized to, among other things,
purchase land and water rights for habitat maintenance and to manage habitat
controlled by the trust (including maintaining the open roosting areas in sandbars
and other riparian habitat areas by keeping them clear of trees and similar vege-
tation). Id. 3-4. Regarding the whooping crane's habitat needs and habitat main-
tenance requirements, see U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, GRAYROCKS DAM
AND RESERVOIR: STAFF REPORT TO THE ENDANGERED SPECIES COMMITTEE 4.3-4.4,
4.11-4.12 (1979).
Basin Electric resented the role of Nebraska irrigation interests in instigating
the Grayrocks litigation, and has sought unsuccessfully to intervene on behalf of
endangered species in water appropriation proceedings in Nebraska. Basin Elec.
Power Co-op. v. Little Blue Natural Resources Dist., 219 Neb. 372, 363 N.W.2d 500
(1985).
193. ENDANGERED SPECIES COMMITTEE, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, APPLICATION FOR Ex-
EMPTION FOR GRAYROCKS DAM AND RESERVOIR PROJECT 3 (1979).
194. See infra text accompanying notes 238-40.
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blocks for implementing irrigation projects, water project financing
and the substantial federal subsidy involved also came under scrutiny.
Federal reclamation projects have been heavily subsidized, first from
public land sales and later from direct congressional appropriations
and power revenues. In addition, reclamation project beneficiaries are
not required to pay interest on project construction funds.195 The rec-
lamation subsidies were initially justified as encouraging settlement of
the West, and later, during the Depression, as providing needed public
employment. Those justifications have since lost their basis.
The first critical examination of federal cost-sharing policies on
water projects came in the final report of the National Water Commis-
sion (NWC).196 The NWC was established in 1968 to examine national
water problems and policies.197 The NWC final report addressed
many topics, ranging from Indian and federal reserved water rights to
interbasin water transfers. 98 However, probably the most controver-
sial NWC recommendations dealt with integrating a "user pay" princi-
ple into federal water project financing policies.199 In this regard the
NWC report was very important, as it politically legitimized criticism
of federal reclamation projects on economic grounds.
The final report noted the important federal subsidy of irrigation
projects.
A primary weakness of the Federal water resources development projects is
that they have been heavily subsidized by the Federal Government; that is, by
all the taxpayers of the Nation, to provide benefits for a few. The water users
on some modern Federal Reclamation projects, for example, repay no more
than 10 percent of the construction costs attributable to irrigation, the remain-
ing cost being borne by the Federal Government in three ways: [1] by not
requiring water users to reimburse the Treasury for the interest on the capital
advanced for project construction, [2] by permitting power revenues and some-
times other nonirrigation revenues to be credited towards irrigation reim-
bursement, and [3] by allocating an unduly large part of the costs to
nonreimbursable purposes.2 0 0
195. For a discussion of the financing of reclamation projects, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 51-59.
196. WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 40.
197. Pub. L. No. 90-515, 82 Stat. 868 (1968). Regarding earlier national water study
commissions, see HOLMES I, supra note 1, at 6, 40-43; HOLMES II, supra note 2, at
37-52.
198. For a general discussion of the recommendations made by the Commission, see
Meyers, The Busy Practitioner's Guide to the National Water Commission Re-
port, 19 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 513 (1974). Legal studies prepared for the
NWC are the most useful materials on water law available. For a list of NWC
legal studies, see WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 40, at 544-45, 547,
551-53.
199. Meyers, supra note 198, at 514-16.
200. WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTuRE, supra note 40, at 128. (Nonreimbursable costs
include cost for navigation, flood control, fish, wildlife, and recreation benefits.
Sax, gupra note 50, at 144.) The NWC report cites testimony that irrigators in the
Columbia River basin project in Washington paid less than 8% of the cost of deliv-
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The NWC then noted that the probable effect of the subsidy on irriga-
tors is wasteful water use.20 ' While irrigation project subsidies do
benefit irrigators, the NWC concluded that they were not in the na-
tional interest because farmers used publicly subsidized irrigation
water from reclamation projects to grow surplus crops for which fed-
eral price supports were (and are) available, increasing the cost of the
price support programs.
The Commission finds... that to continue subsidization of new irrigation
projects does have serious disadvantages for the Nation. The most serious is
the expansion of the productive capacity of the Nation's agricultural plant
when there is a surplus of many crops-a surplus that is expected to continue
into the future. Reclamation projects add to that surplus, to the detriment of
farmers already in business and at a high cost to the taxpayer. Not only must
the taxpayer pay a large portion of the costs of bringing new land into produc-
tion [via irrigation projects], but he must also pay for farm price-support pro-
grams, the cost of which go up as farm production of price-supported crops
increases....
It is doubtful that taxpayers as consumers benefit greatly from these price-
support expenditures or from subsidizing irrigation projects. For those crops
which come under farm price-support programs, prices at the food store will
be as high as they would otherwise be. But with greater production from sub-
sidized irrigation, more tax funds will be required (1) to maintain price-sup-
port levels and (2) to underwrite the irrigation subsidy.2 0 2
The Commission concludes that subsidization of new irrigation projects is
not justified on... economic grounds.... [F]ederally subsidized irrigation does
increase farm surpluses, increasing the costs of price-support programs and
disadvantaging farmers in other parts of the country. Direct beneficiaries of
Federal irrigation developments should, therefore, be compelled to pay in full
the costs of projects allocation to irrigation in conformity to the general princi-
ple of full-cost repayment proposed for other water development projects else-
where in this report.2 0 3
In its formal conclusions the NWC recommended new federal water
project cost-sharing legislation be developed, and that irrigators be re-
quired to pay their proportionate share of reclamation project costs,
ering water to irrigated fields. Gross (not net) crop receipts would cover only
53% of the costs of irrigation water. In that project, irrigators would pay less than
24% of total project costs; the balance would be covered by hydroelectric power
revenues. WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 40, at 129-30.
201. "When irrigators receive water on a subsidized basis, incentives to use water care-
fully and efficiently are often removed. Where water is priced substantially be-
low cost, it will be to the advantage of irrigators to be lavish in its use and
neglectful of programs to stretch supplies and improve the productivity of water."
WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 40, at 129.
202. 1k at 147-48. Earlier in its report the NWC detailed the effect of the then current
and projected crop surpluses on future federal reclamation projects. The Com-
mission concluded that subsidized water development could not be justified by a
need to increase agricultural production since current capacity should be ade-
quate until at least the year 2000. Id. at 141-42.
203. Id at 148. When the NWC report was published approximately 37% of land irri-
gated with reclamation water produced price-supported crops. Id- at 129.
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including interest.204
The NWC report signaled the end of an era regarding public atti-
tudes towards reclamation projects. No longer would reclamation
projects automatically be assumed to be worthy of significant public
subsidies. The West had been wor., the Depression was over, and irri-
gation projects should therefore be evaluated on a more conventional
basis: whether they represented a sound investment which could
meet realistic payback requirements. Unfortunately the NWC recom-
mendations were politically ahead of their time. The recommenda-
tions were not embraced by Congress, which traditionally has been
reluctant to adopt reclamation policy reforms.20 5 However, the
NWC's recommendations were revived in 1978 with President Carter's
water project hit list and water policy proposals. The project funding
stalemate which has resulted from the Carter water policy initiatives
may lead to the ultimate implementation of NWC recommendations.
F. Ground Water Management: Regulations and Rescue Projects
The original purpose of the reclamation project was to allow farm-
ers in river valleys to reclaim arid lands to cultivation under irrigation.
However, irrigation projects have also been developed to supply irriga-
tion and municipal water to regions where ground water supplies were
being depleted, most notably in southern California.206 This rescue
project 207 aspect of new reclamation projects has become the driving
force for surface water development as regions of Nebraska dependent
on ground water irrigation realize that local ground water supplies ul-
timately will be depleted and a source of supplemental water will be
needed to maintain irrigation.
Ground water has been the major source of irrigation water in Ne-
braska since the late 1950s. 208 Of the 7.3 million acres irrigated in Ne-
braska, 6.2 million are irrigated with ground water.209 As a result of
this heavy ground water use for irrigation 210 several areas of the state
204. Id. at 497.
205. See HOLMEs I, supra note 1, at 31-38.
206. Aiken, supra note 66, at 934-35; Aiken, Ground WaterMiningLaw andPolicy, 53
COLO. L. REv. 505, 518-21 (1982) [hereinafter Ground Water Mining].
207. The term "rescue project" was coined by Professor Charles Corker. C. CORKER,
GROUNDWATER LAW, MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 256-60 (1971) (Nat'l
Water Conm'n Report No. NWC-72-026, Legal Study No. 6).
208. In 1959 the number of acres irrigated with ground water in Nebraska surpassed
for the first time the number of acres irrigated with surface water. Aiken, supra
note 66, at 948.
209. M. ELLIS & D. PEDERSON, GROUND WATER LEVELS IN NEBRASKA, 1985, at 58
(1986) (Neb. Water Survey Paper No. 61, Univ. of Neb. Conservation & Survey
Div.). The statistics regarding the number of irrigated acres in Nebraska are not
consistent. Aiken, supra note 66, at 918 n.5.
210. Ground water use for irrigation constitutes 87% of total Nebraska ground water
use and is the major reason that ground water levels are declining in several re-
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are facing ground water depletion. 211 Projections to the year 2020 sug-
gest that approximately one million acres of land currently irrigated
will be lost to irrigated production, and approximately one million
acres will receive only partial irrigation because of ground water
depletion.212
Theoretically there are three public policy responses to the threat
of ground water depletion: do nothing, regulate ground water devel-
opment and use to stretch aquifer life, or develop a rescue project to
substitute impounded surface water for depleted ground water.213
Most western states have elected to merely regulate ground water de-
velopment, i.e., installation of new wells in areas facing depletion, in
effect rewarding those who caused the problem by allowing them to
monopolize the remaining supply.214 California has pioneered the res-
cue project approach of dealing with depletion by obtaining supple-
mental water to maintain current uses. 215 While Nebraska statutes
have authorized ground water regulations to control depletion for the
last decade, the hope of obtaining a rescue project has allowed Ne-
braska irrigators to resist ground water controls. Probably the major
reason LB 1106 was enacted was to facilitate development of rescue
projects for Nebraska ground water irrigators.
Nebraska was one of the last western states to authorize ground
water regulations. 216 Although depletion was apparent in the 1950s,
ground water regulations were not authorized until the 1959 legisla-
ture authorized irrigators to create ground water conservation dis-
tricts (GWCDs).217 Effective ground water regulations did not
gions of the state. See W. SOLLEY, E. CHASE & W. MANN, ESTIMATED USE OF
WATER IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1980, at 18, 36 (1983) (Geological Survey Circu-
lar 1001, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Geological Survey); Aiken, supra note 66, at
918-19.
211. The regions include the Alliance area in Box Butte county; the Upper Republican
area of Chase, Perkins and Dundy counties; the Central Platte area of Buffalo
and Hall counties, the Little Blue area of Adams, Clay, Fillmore, Thayer, and
Nuckolls counties; the Upper Big Blue area of Hamilton, York, Seward and Polk
counties, and the O'Neil [Holt county] area. M. ELLIS & D. PEDERSON, supra note
209, at 3. For a discussion of what constitutes ground water depletion, see Aiken,
supra note 206, at 509-14.
212. NEB. NATURAL RESOURCES COMMISSION, SUMMARY OF THE NEBRASKA RESEARCH
FOR THE SIX STATE HIGH PLAINS OGALLALA AQUIFER STUDY 28 (1981) [hereinaf-
ter HIGH PLAINS STUDY].
213. See Aiken, supra note 66, at 930-35; Ground Water Mining, supra note 206, at
513-14.
214. Ground Water Mining, supra note 206, at 514-18.
215. See id. at 518-21.
216. For a discussion of western ground water depletion statutes, see Aiken, supra
note 66, at 931-34.
217. Ground Water Conservation Act of Nebraska, 1959 Neb. Laws ch. 221, LB 554
(codified at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-614 to -634 (1984)) (repealed, effective Jan. 1,
1987). See Aiken, supra note 66, at 950-51. The GWCDs implemented ground
water runoff controls, which subsequently were applied statewide in the Ground
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develop until the 1975 Ground Water Management Act (GWIVIA) was
enacted.218 The GWMA follows a local control rather than a state
control philosophy in that local natural resources districts (NRDs)
have the sole authority to initiate control area proceedings by request-
ing the Nebraska Department of Water Resources (DWR) to hold a
control area designation hearing.2 1 9 If the DWR determines that a
control area should be designated,22 0 the NRD may (subject to DWR
approval) regulate well spacing,221 require rotation of pumping, allo-
cate the quantity of ground water to be withdrawn, and ban the instal-
lation of new wells.222
Six control area hearings have been requested by NRDs, but only
three have been designated by the DWR,223 indicating that the state-
Water Management Act. The GWCDs, in cooperation with the University of Ne-
braska Extension Service, also pioneered demonstrations of irrigation scheduling,
whereby crop water needs are monitored during the growing season and irriga-
tion water applications are scheduled in quantity and amount to supply only as
much water as the crop then requires id. at 951 n.163. For a brief discussion of
irrigation scheduling, see Aiken, The National Water Policy Review and Western
Water Rights Law Reformn. An Overview, 59 NEB. L. REV. 327, 329-33 (1980).
Even though the GWCDs did not directly regulate ground water withdrawals,
which would be necessary to significantly extend aquifer life, their experiences
with runoff regulations and irrigation scheduling were significant in formulating
subsequent ground water management policies.
218. Nebraska Ground Water Management and Protection Act 1975, Neb. Laws 1975,
LB 577 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-656 to -674 (1984 & 1986 Cum. Supp.)).
See R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, supra note 7, at 247-57; Aiken, supra note
66, at 960-62; Aiken & Supalla, Ground Water Mining and Western Water
Rights: the Nebraska Experience, 24 S.D.L. REV. 607, 620-29 (1979).
219. NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-658(3) (1984 & 1986 Cum. Supp.). The fear of state regula-
tion of ground water led to deletion on the floor of a provision authorizing the
DWR to initiate ground water control proceedings on its own motion. Aiken &
Supalla, supra note 218, at 620.
220. A control area may be designated if the DWR director concludes, after a public
hearing, that the uncontrolled development and use of ground water has caused
or is likely to cause an inadequate ground water supply to meet present or reason-
ably foreseeable needs. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-658(1)(a) (1984 & 1986 Cum. Supp.).
In making that determination, the DWR director's considerations must include:
(1) whether conflicts between ground water users are occurring or may reason-
ably be anticipated, and (2) whether ground water users are experiencing, or
likely to experience in the foreseeable future, substantial economic hardship as a
direct result of current or anticipated ground water development or use. Id. § 46-
658(2).
221. State statutes require new irrigation wells to be located at least 600 feet from
existing registered irrigation wells owned by another and at least 1000 feet away
from existing registered municipal or industrial wells. NEB. REV. STAT. § S 46-
609, -651 (1984). Greater spacing requirements may be established in control ar-
eas. For a more complete discussion of well-spacing statutes see R. HARNSBERGER
& N. THORSON, supra note 7, at 231-33. For a discussion of well registration re-
quirements, see Aiken, supra note 66, at 976-80; R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON,
supra note 7, at 230-31.
222. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-666(1)(5) (1984 & 1986 Cure. Supp.).
223. Aiken, supra note 66, at 962-67. All three unsuccessful control areas designation
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local checks and balances built into the GWMA were present.224 Of
the three control areas designated, in only the Upper Republican con-
trol area has the NRD adopted regulations with the potential to signif-
icantly extend aquifer life through reduced irrigation withdrawals.225
Control area irrigators, and irrigators in other regions facing ground
water depletion226 are looking to the Platte River to supply water for
rescue projects to supplement declining ground water supplies and to
forestall imposition of ground water controls.227
requests were denied by the DWR director on the basis that the problems com-
plained of were simply well interference problems. Id. at 962-63, 965-67. The last
unsuccessful control area designation request, made by the Lower Loup NRD to
deal with well interference, soil erosion, and water quality problems associated
with sandhills irrigation development, was denied on the additional basis that
erosion and water quality concerns were beyond the scope of the GWMA. Id. at
966-67. The GWMA was subsequently amended to address ground water pollu-
tion from irrigation. Act of May 15, 1981, 1981 Neb. Laws, LB 146, § 6 (codified at
NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-658(1)(b) (1984)) repealed by 1986 Neb. Laws, LB 894, § 22.
224. The requirement for DWR approval of control area designation requests re-
flected the conservative philosophy that control area designation should be lim-
ited to circumstances where controls are truly needed to deal with depletion, and
that one state role should be to prevent hasty NRD action in reaction to local
ground water concerns. The § 46-658(1) designation requirement of present or
prospective inadequacy of ground water supply, the condition not met for the
three unsuccessful control area designation requests, precludes control areas be-
ing used as a method for dealing with well interference conflicts if depletion is
not present or imminent.
225. The political difficulty associated with adopting effective ground water controls,
aside from the obvious one of interfering with the farmer's traditional freedom in
making agricultural production decisions, is that irrigators will ultimately be re-
quired to reduce irrigated acreage, grow crops using less water, or both to live
within their reduced allocations. The benefit of this, of course, is that irrigators
will irrigate longer than they could if they were not regulated. See Ground
Water Mining, supra note 206, at 507, 512-13, 517-18.
226. The areas facing depletion that have not requested control area designation in-
clude the O'Neill area of Holt county, where Lower Niobrara NRD irrigators
hope to be served by the Norden irrigation project; the Central Platte area within
Hall and Buffalo counties, where Central Platte NRD irrigators hope to be served
by the Prairie Bend and Twin Valley irrigation projects; and the Alliance area in
Box Butte county where Upper Niobrara-White NRD irrigators have not yet be-
gun to pursue either a rescue project or ground water controls. M. ELLIS & D.
PEDERSON, supra note 209, at 3; NEB. DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, SUMMARY OF
PROPOSED PROJECTS FROM THE PLATTE AND SOUTH PLATTE RIvERs (1985) [here-
inafter PLATTE PROJECTS SUMMARY] (copy available from author upon request).
227. All three control area NRDs have their own rescue project that they are pursu-
ing: the Enders project for the Upper Republican, Catherland for the Little Blue
NRD, and the Landmark project for the Upper Big Blue NRD. PLATTE PROJECTS
SUMMARY, supra note 226. Of the three, however, only the Upper Republican
NRD is also implementing a ground water control strategy to slow depletion.
The Enders application was denied by the Department of Water Resources.
Application A-15738 for a Permit to Divert Water from the South Platte River for
Storage in Enders Reservoir, (Nov. 4, 1985) (Neb. Dep't of Water Resources)
(copy available from author upon request). The application was denied, because
sufficient unappropriated water was not available for appropriation. Id. at 5. The
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The GWMA became the Ground Water Management and Protec-
tion Act (GMPA) in 1981. The denial of control area status for the
Lower Loup NRD was the impetus for expanding the GWMVA to in-
clude ground water quality protection as a control area designation
and administration objective.2 28 However no NRD has attempted to
utilize this new feature of the statute. The GMPA was expanded
again in 1982 when ground water management areas were established
as an alternative to ground water control areas.229 Management areas
may be established unilaterally by an NRD after it has prepared a
ground water management plan. The plan must include establish-
ment of a ground water reservoir life goal and a discussion of how
ground water controls would be used to accomplish that life goal.2 30
Management plans have been prepared by all NRDs as required by LB
1106,231 but no management areas have been implemented.
The GWMA (and subsequently the GMPA) have provided NRDs
with administrative authorities which would extend aquifer life by re-
ducing ground water withdrawals. 232 However, the local option fea-
DWR director also concluded that the applicants had not meet the burden of
proof that the proposed reservoir would not jeopardize downstream endangered
species or their habitat. Id. at 11. The order denying the appropriation is on ap-
peal to the Nebraska Supreme Court.
228. Groundwater Management and Protection Act, 1981 Neb. Laws, LB 146, § 6 (codi-
fied at NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-658(1)0,) (1984)) repealed by 1986 Neb. Laws, LB 894,
§ 22. Regarding the Lower Loup cohtrol area denial, see Aiken, supra note 66, at
966-67. Interestingly, the Lower Loup did not reapply for control area designation
when designation criteria were expanded to include ground water pollution re-
sulting from irrigation.
229. Act of March 11, 1982, 1982 Neb. Laws, LB 375 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-
673.01 to -673.13 (1984 & 1986 Cum. Supp.)). See R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON,
supra note 7, at 257-61.
230. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-673.01(12), (13) (1984). Authorized management area regu-
lations parallel authorized control area regulations. Id. at § 46-673.09 (1984 &
1986 Cum. Supp). However, well drilling moratoria are not available in manage-
ment areas. Id. Well spacing restrictions may be imposed only to the extent that
they would not preclude a landowner from developing irrigation. Id. at § 46-
673.12 (1984). If ground water allocations are established, they must be based on
the number of acres being irrigated, rather than on another basis (such as irriga-
ble acres). I& at § 46-673.10. The irrigated acres requirement is a response to the
realization that ground water allocations could be used to restrict irrigation to
lands that met land suitability criteria if water were allocated on the basis of land
suitability rather than water availability. Such an approach would have severely
limited irrigation development in the Nebraska sandhills where most land is un-
suited for irrigation due to steep slopes and sandy soils. See NEBRASKA NATURAL
REsouRcEs COMMISSION, PROGRESS REPORT ON THE SANDHILLS AREA
STuDY(1984). For a discussion of alternative bases of ground water allocation, see
Aiken & Supalla, supra note 218, at 635-37.
231. Act of April 10, 1984, 1984 Neb. Laws, LB 1106, § 37, (codified at NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 46-673.01 (1984)).
232. Regarding the effect of ground water regulations on aquifer life, see Ground
Water Mining, supra note 206, at 509-14.
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ture233 and the lure of rescue projects have combined to create a
political climate in which effective controls have been rejected in all
but the Upper Republican control area. The hope of developing a res-
cue project has led to a de facto do nothing ground water management
approach in Nebraska as irrigators politically resist imposition of
ground water controls on the ground that the rescue project will ex-
tend aquifer life just as ground water controls would, although in a
different fashion. Nebraska should consider the recently enacted Ari-
zona statute which authorizes state officials to require ground water
controls to control depletion,234 particularly given the limited effect
rescue projects can have in sustaining ground water based irrigation in
Nebraska.235
G. Nebraska Endangered Species Act
In addition to the GWMA, the 1975 Nebraska Unicameral enacted
the Nebraska Endangered Species Act (NESA).236 NESA was passed
primarily to obtain federal funding for state endangered species pro-
grams.237 However, section 6(3) of LB 145 (and the current statute)
233. The requirement that only NRDs may initiate ground water control proceedings
by requesting a DWR control area designation hearing has already been noted.
This local control feature is compounded by a strong rural bias on NRD boards:
NRD board members are not elected by population but rather by subdistricts.
Board members are nominated by subdistricts based on area rather than popula-
tion, and then are elected at large. NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-3214(2), (3) (1983 & 1986
Cum. Supp.). This gives rural residents (and in heavily irrigated NRDS, irriga-
tors) a disproportionate voice in NRD governance. One wonders if NRDs would
be so slow to act to deal with depletion if they were not dominated by irrigators
reluctant to regulate themselves to stretch the life of local ground water supplies.
234. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-412 to -414 (Supp. 1985). See generally Kyl, The 1980
Arizona Groundwater Management Act- From Inception to Current Constitu-
tional Challenge, 53 U. COLO. L. REv. 471 (1982).
235. Even if all hoped for rescue projects were developed, they would keep only a
small fraction of the acres otherwise reverting to dryland production in irrigated
production. See infra text accompanying notes 354-56.
236. Nongame and Endangered Species Conservation Act, 1975 Neb. Laws, LB 145
(codified at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 37-430 to -438 (1984)). LB 145 was based on a
model bill drafted by professional wildlife conservation organizations and the
Council on State Government. LB 145 Hearing 10 Committee on Constitutional
Revision and Recreation Interim Study Committee, 84th Leg., 1st Sess. (Jan. 23,
1975) (statement of Bill Bailey, Neb. Game & Parks Comm'n) [hereinafter LB 145
Hearing].
237. Federal grants for state endangered species programs meeting federal require-
ments are available pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c) (1973) (amended 1978).
It is the intent of LB 145 to provide adequate statutory authority to the
Game and Parks Commission to enter into a cooperative agreement with
the Federal Government as provided by the Endangered Species Act of
1973. Entry into such agreement would: (1) preclude federal pre-emp-
tion of the State's authority to regulate the "taking" of resident
threatened or endangered wildlife and (2) make the state eligible to par-
ticipate in the grant in-aid [sic] provisions of the Federal Act.
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contained nonjeopardy language virtually identical to the 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(c) nonjeopardy language of the 1973 FESA.
The Governor shall review other programs administered by him and utilize
such programs in furtherance of the purposes of the act. All other state de-
partments and agencies shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of
the [Nebraska Game and Parks] commission, utilize their authorities in fur-
therance of the purposes of this act by carrying out programs for the conserva-
tion of endangered species and threatened species listed pursuant to section 5
of this act, and by taking such action necessary to insure that actions author-
ized, funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence
of such endangered species or result in the destruction or modification of
habitat of such species which is determined by the commission to be
critical.2 3 8
Compare the italicized language with the corresponding language of
section 7 of the 1973 FESA:
and by taking such action necessary to insure that actions authorized, funded,
or carried out by such agency is not likely to jeopardize the continued exist-
ence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruc-
tion or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is determined by
the Secretary, after consultation as appropriate with affected States, to be
critical.2 3 9
Both provisions require state and federal agencies, respectively, to in-
sure that agency action does not jeopardize endangered species or
their critical habitat. The only significant difference between the two
is that section 37-435(3) is absolute in its nonjeopardy requirement.
Section 37-435(3) requires state agencies to take such action as to in-
sure that agency actions do not jeopardize endangered species or their
critical habitat, an absolute prohibition. Section 1536(c), in contrast,
only requires that federal agencies take action to insure that their
agency actions "are not likely" to jeopardize endangered species or
their critical habitat. Thus Nebraska state agencies are under a
greater requirement to avoid jeopardizing endangered species or their
habitat than are federal agencies.24 0
LB 145 was debated prior to the 1978 Tellico and Grayrocks deci-
sions. Thus the legislative debate completely missed the important
point that the nonjeopardy provisions could interfere with state-au-
thorized construction projects, particularly water projects.2 4 ' The leg-
LB 145 Statement of Intent, Committee on Constitutional Revision & Recreation
Interim Study Committee, 84th Leg., 1st Sess. (Jan. 21,1975) (copy available from
author upon request).
238. LB 145, § 6(3) (1975) (emphasis added). The language of the bill as introduced
was not modified when enacted and is currently codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 37-
435(3) (1984).
239. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c) (1973) (emphasis added) (amended 1978).
240. While § 1535(c) was amended in 1978, the agency duty to insure no jeopardy was
not changed, although the possibility of obtaining an exemption was created.
241. LB 145 Floor Debate at 602-03, 84th Leg., 1st Sess. (1975) (statement of Senator
Kime). Id at 613-14, 617. Another issue that generated some debate was whether
LB 145 authorized the Game and Parks Commission to condemn private property
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islative debate focused instead on whether a new state program could
be financially justified,242 and whether endangered species conserva-
tion would better be assumed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
rather than by the Game and Parks Commission.243 It would not be
until the national snail darter controversy and the Grayrocks decision
that Nebraska water developers would realize the threat that NESA
posed to their pending water projects. Little Blue II would raise
NESA in the water project context for the first time, and create the
legal and political impasse that resulted in LB 1106.
H. Federal and State Water Project Funding
As noted earlier, federal water project funding through the recla-
mation program has driven western surface water development. While
state law provides the framework within which appropriations are ac-
quired and administered, federal programs provide the funding that
makes water project development possible. Thus, while state law au-
thorizes formation of reclamation districts and the grant and adminis-
tration of appropriations, the key to successful water project
development is federal funding.244
The Carter Hit List. One of the most controversial water policy
developments in recent times was President Carter's controversial
water project hit list.245 However, the Carter list was controversial
for endangered species conservation purposes without express legislative ap-
proval. Id. at 613-14, 617.
242. The only reference to the jeopardy was an unexplained reference to state agency
cooperation in testimony presented by the Nebraska Game and Parks Commis-
sion, the agency that would administer LB 145. LB 145 Hearing, supra note 236 at
11 (statement of Bill Bailey, Neb. Game & Parks Comm'n).
243. The issue was whether the Game and Parks Commission was so dominated by
hunting interests that it would not properly administer a program dealing with
non-game wildlife species. Id. at 18 (statement of Dorothy Wheeler). This was
probably the result of Commission support of an unsuccessful bill to establish a
hunting season for the mourning dove. Id. at 17. The bill was very controversial.
Id. at 23 (statement of Bob Wick, Grand Island Audubon Soc'y). However, a rep-
resentative of the Nebraska Sierra Club expressed confidence in the Game and
Parks Commission to even-handedly administer LB 145. Id. at 19 (statement of
Tim Hergenrader).
244. The High Plains Study illustrates the importance of federal funding to water pro-
ject development. See Ground Water Mining, supra note 206, at 522-26. Because
the study ultimately recommended against developing a rescue project importing
Missouri River water to the High Plains region of Nebraska, Colorado, Kansas,
Oklahoma, New Mexico and Texas because of excessive project costs, the hopes
of that gigantic water diversion have been dashed, at least temporarily. A second
illustration is Arizona's adoption of relatively effective ground water regulations
to obtain continued federal support for the massive Central Arizona Project. Re-
garding the CAP, see id. at 521. Regarding the federal role in adopting the
ground water code, see Kyle, supra note 234, at 502.
245. The hit list was so named because President Carter proposed deleting from the
1978 federal budget funding for 19 water projects that had been previously au-
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not only because it proposed to deauthorize for the first time water
projects previously authorized by Congress. Perhaps more signifi-
cantly, the hit list's accompanying water policy initiatives also pro-
posed to modify federal water project funding policies and to require
substantive reforms of state water laws if states wished to qualify for
federal water project funding. To better understand the Carter water
policy initiatives we must first review the interaction between state
water development and appropriation policies and federal water pro-
ject funding policies.
As discussed earlier, development of a water project is a process
that involves both state and federal laws. First, local project sponsors,
if they believe that they may eventually qualify for federal water pro-
ject funding, will establish the local district (reclamation district, irri-
gation district, etc.) to serve as the local project sponsor. This
typically involves holding an election to establish the district.246 The
next step is then to develop preliminary project plans, often referred
to as prefeasibility studies, upon which to base an appropriation appli-
cation for the project. The prefeasibility studies may be undertaken
with or without federal assistance. If the district obtains the state ap-
propriation, it then can qualify for federal project planning assist-
ance.247 If the federal agency, typically the Bureau of Reclamation,
determines that the proposed project meets feasibility standards, it
will recommend that the project be authorized by Congress and that
project planning and construction funds be appropriated.24s The time
period from initial district organization to project construction may be
twenty to thirty years.24 9
As described earlier, this process, complicated enough, has been
further complicated by federal environmental laws (notably NEPA,
section 404 of the Clean Water Act, and FESA), which require that
environmental impacts of proposed federal actions be identified, and
that certain environmental effects be avoided. These project chal-
lenges are typically made after the project has been authorized by
Congress, when project planning and development is fairly advanced
thorized by Congress but which had not yet been completed. President Carter
proposed to deauthorize those projects. Scheele, President Carter and the Water
Projects: A Case Study in Presidential and Congressional Decision-Making, 8
PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY 348 (1978). Interestingly the 19 projects rep-
resented only a small proportion of the 342 projects then authorized. Id at 352.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 43-47.
247. The district must hold a state appropriation for the proposed project to qualify for
federal planning assistance. The water right, even though it is not perfected, is
mandatory to obtain federal project assistance. Regarding appropriation perfec-
tion, see R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORsON, supra note 7, at 84-86. See also supra
note 39.
248. Sax, supra note 50, at 138-40. Regarding the test for project feasibility, see id. at
141-47.
249. See WATER POLICIES FOR THE FurruRE, supra note 40, at 393-94.
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and completion becomes more likely. If the project state has enacted
similar environmental statutes, challenges to the project may be made
at an earlier stage in the development process when the district ap-
plies for its project water appropriation.
The Carter hit list did not propose to alter significantly this pro-
cess, but merely to deauthorize 19 of the over 300 water projects then
authorized. However, the water policy initiatives proposed in Carter's
1977 environmental address proposed going beyond mere project
deauthorization. Drawing heavily from the water policy reforms pro-
posed by the NWC, the Carter water policy initiatives would have im-
posed cost-sharing requirements on project water users. The policies
would have required states to make substantive changes in their water
laws to qualify for federal project cost sharing assistance. These water
law changes included recognition of instream values, ground water
management requirements to prevent or control ground water deple-
tion, and efficient use requirements to reduce irrigation water
demands.250
The Carter water policy initiatives aroused a storm of protest in
western governors' mansions and in Congress. The governors accused
the Carter administration of being ignorant of western water needs.2 51
Congress resented the intrusion in what it considered a useful and im-
portant political prerogative, as water projects for a home district usu-
ally can be translated into votes.2 52 In the end, however, Carter was
able to make most of his project deauthorizations stick, and the 1977
water resources bill was the last one enacted to date.253 Even though
Carter's water policy initiatives were not implemented by Congress
during his term, elements of them will undoubtledly be included in
the ultimate federal cost sharing programs, if water developers can
obtain any federal assistance at all.
The Reagan administration proved to be no more a friend to water
development than its predecessor. Reagan abolished the regional
river basin commissions 25 4 and has been willing to try to balance the
budget at the expense of new water projects. Only recently has a fed-
eral water resources bill, the Water Resources Development Act of
1986, been enacted.255 The Act establishes new cost sharing require-
250. See id. at 230-43, 247-52, 256-59, 271-79. See also Hillhouse & Hannay, Practical
Implications of the New National Water Policy, 25 ROcKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 22-
1 (1979).
251. Matheson, President Carter's Water Policy: Partnership or Preemption? 25
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1-1 (1979) (the author is the Governor of Utah);
Scheele, supra note 245, at 353 n.24.
252. Scheele, supra note 245, at 353 n.24.
253. While existing projects have been provided continuing funding in annual federal
appropriation bills, no new projects have been authorized since 1977.
254. B. ANDREWS & M. SANsoNE, supra note 39, at 221-22.
255. Water Resources Development Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-662.
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ments for Corps of Engineers projects: 35% local cost sharing for flood
control, 100% for hydropower generation, 100% for municipal and in-
dustrial water supply, 35% for irrigation water supply, and 50% for
recreation benefits.256 The Act does not specify what local interests
would be responsible for providing the local cost share. Thus the local
interests could include the state, the region in which the project would
be constructed, the local water users directly benefiting from the pro-
ject, or some combination of these interests. Significantly, the Act
does not establish cost sharing requirements for reclamation
projects. 257
The stalemate over federal funding for reclamation projects stem-
ming from the Carter hit list has yet to be resolved. However, given
the current concern with balancing the federal budget, it seems clear
that any new reclamation projects constructed in the future will re-
quire significant state and/or local cost sharing to qualify for federal
funding, if federal funding is available at all. The golden era of recla-
mation has ended, and the water policy future identified by the Na-
tional Water Commission has begun.
IV. LITTLE BLUE
By 1980 the water development picture in Nebraska had become
uncertain. Intensive ground water use for irrigation had led to wide-
spread ground water level declines, creating a demand for rescue
projects. Traditional federal reclamation policies had lulled ground
water users into a false sense of security that ground water depletion
would be offset through project development. This expectation was
reflected in state "local option" ground water policies of no regulation,
which were based on the hope that supplemental water supply devel-
opment would forestall the need for meaningful ground water regula-
tions. However, the hope that rescue projects could be developed was
becoming less realistic: federal environmental policies had by this
time slowed the Norden project on the Niobrara river, and the snail
darter and Grayrocks cases suggested that reclamation projects them-
selves would become endangered if they jeopardized endangered spe-
cies or their habitat. The Grayrocks litigation had resulted in creating
the Platte River Whooping Crane Trust, which was viewed by devel-
opers as a standing guarantee that environmental interests would get
their day in court if the Platte were developed. The Carter water pro-
ject hit list sent shock waves throughout the water development com-
munity, raising the frightening specter that the days of federal
256. Id- § 103(c).
257. Many observers expect the 35% irrigation cost share for Corps projects to be ex-
tended to the Bureau of Reclamation as well.
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subsidies were over and that states or (worse yet) irrigators would be
required to provide significant funding for reclamation projects.
But more water policy controversy was to surface. The judicial re-
versal of a longstanding prohibition against interbasin surface water
transfers led to the current Platte River water wars, pitting developer
against developer in a legal battle that would do more arid states
proud. The Little Blue cases would create the policy impasse en-
gendering the Water Independence Congress and LB 1106.
A. Little Blue I
While ground water irrigation development increased the potential
demands on the Platte for supplemental irrigation water, and federal
environmental policy changes were making water project implemen-
tation more difficult, the Platte valley was still quiet, at least on the
surface. Irrigation interests in the Blue and Republican River basins,
who lacked the surface water resources to augment declining ground
water supplies, felt stymied by the 1936 Osterman decision prohibiting
interbasin transfers of streamflow.258 Attempts to overrule Osterman
through legislation had failed, resulting in stormy, divisive legislative
debates.259 Platte River interests were secure in the feeling that there
was sufficient streamflow available to support their needs.
This calm was shattered by the first salvo in the present Platte
River wars, the 1980 decision of Little Blue Natural Resources Dist. v.
Lower Platte North Natural Resources Dist. (Little Blue I).260 Little
Blue proposed to divert water coming from the Tri-County irrigation
system to irrigate land in the Blue River basin originally proposed to
be part of the Tri-County project but eliminated by Osterman. The
DWR found that there was sufficient unappropriated water available
for the irrigation project, but concluded that Osterman legally pre-
vented the DWR from granting the appropriation. 261 Little Blue ap-
pealed the decision of the department, and the Nebraska Supreme
Court overruled Osterman in a unanimous decision.26 2 The court
258. Regarding Osterman, see R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, supra note 7, at 355-
57. Regarding interbasin transfers, see i- at 353-54.
259. See Interbasin Transfers, supra note 63, at 98-103.
260. 206 Neb. 535, 294 N.W.2d 598 (1980); see also Pearson, Constitutional Restraints
on Water Development in Nebraska, 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 695 (1983); Note,
Water Law-Transbasin Diversion in Nebraska, 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 887
(1981).
261. Applications 15146 and 15148 of the Little Blue Natural Resources District; Order
of Denial (June 25, 1979) (Neb. Dep't of Water Resources) (copy available from
author upon request). The DWR relied on an attorney general's opinion conclud-
ing that Osterman precluded granting the application. Letter from Paul L. Doug-
las, Nebraska Attorney General, to John W. Neuberger, Director of Water
Resources (June 21, 1979) (copy available from author upon request).
262. Little Blue Natural Resources Dist. v. Lower Platte North Natural Resources
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ruled that the constitutional dedication of water to the people of the
state did not dedicate that use to a particular river basin.263 The court
also interpreted section 46-205 to authorize interbasin transfers if the
water diverted would be returned to the river of origin or to the Mis-
souri.264 This also overruled that portion of the Osterman decision
which had interpreted the Missouri River basin proviso of section 46-
205 as having no meaning. The court ruled, however, that section 46-
235 required the DWR director to determine whether the Little Blue
appropriation was in the public interest before deciding whether to
issue the permit. As the director had not done so, the court remanded
the order back to the DWR to make the requisite findings.265 The
court did not discuss what should be taken into consideration in deter-
mining the public interest.
Little Blue I triggered a rush for Platte River water. Out-of-basin
interests went to work to develop project proposals for which they
could file appropriation applications. Those Platte River interests that
had not yet filed their appropriation applications for their Platte
projects rushed to do so, in order to file before any out-of-basin inter-
ests filed.266 The previous calm was gone forever; now Platte River
water was up for grabs and every water developer wanted its share.
Developers also recognized that there was not enough water to meet
all project needs. They girded themselves to do battle with other pro-
ject sponsors to see whose application would survive for possible im-
plementation. Those with later filing dates had even more incentive to
derail opposing applications; unless they could do so their appropria-
tion would be worthless as there would be insufficient unappropriated
water available for diversion and storage after senior rights were
served.
B. Little Blue II
After Little Blue I, the DWR subsequently determined that the
Little Blue project was in the public interest.267 That decision was
immediately appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court. Before the
Dist., 206 Neb. 535, 294 N.W.2d 598 (1980) [Little Blue I]. For a discussion of Little
Blue I, see R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, supra note 7, at 362-64. The irriga-
tion defendants in Little Blue I far outnumbered the environmental defendants,
indicating that the real controversy with Platte River water projects is not simply
an environmentalist versus developer conflict but a project versus project con-
flict. Id. at 362.
263. 206 Neb. 535, 543, 294 N.W.2d 598, 602 (1980).
264. Id at 546, 294 N.W.2d at 603.
265. Id- at 548, 294 N.W.2d at 604.
266. See PLATTE PROJEcTS SUMMARY, supra note 226.
267. Applications 15146 and 15148 of the Little Blue Natural Resources District; Order
of Approval (Dec. 29, 1980) (Neb. Dept. of Water Resources) (copy available from
author upon request). See R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, supra note 7, at 366.
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court could issue its Little Blue II opinion, however, legislation was
enacted defining public interest considerations for interbasin transfer
appropriation applications.268 Interbasin transfer appropriations can
be granted, after considering the economic and environmental costs
and benefits of the proposed appropriation and water supply alterna-
tives, if the benefits to the state of granting the application outweigh
the benefits to the state of denying the appropriation. 269 Unfortu-
nately the Nebraska Supreme Court did not have the opportunity to
interpret these provisions in Little Blue II. Instead, the court ruled
that the application should be remanded for further proceedings
under NESA.270 As noted above, the act requires state agencies to
consult with the Game and Parks Commission to determine whether
the proposed agency action would interfere with the continued exist-
ence of threatened or endangered species or their critical habitat.271
NESA also prohibits state agencies from taking actions that would
jeopardize the continued existence of threatened or endangered spe-
cies or their critical habitat. The DWR had not consulted with the
Commission regarding possible effects of the Little Blue project on
268. Act approved May 22, 1981, 1981 Neb. Laws, LB 252 §§ 5, 6 (codified at NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 46-288 to -289 (1984 & 1986 Cum. Supp.)). See R. HARNSBERGER & N.
THORSON, supra note 7, at 364-66.
269. The specific criteria required to be considered in making this public interest de-
termination are: (1) the economic, environmental, and other benefits of the pro-
posed interbasin transfer and use; (2) any adverse impacts of the proposed
interbasin transfer and use; (3) the current and reasonably foreseeable beneficial
uses of water in the basin of origin; (4) the economic, environmental and other
benefits of leaving the water in the basin of origin for current or future beneficial
uses; (5) alternative sources of water available to the applicant; and (6) alterna-
tive sources of water available to the basin of origin for future beneficial uses.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-289 (1984 & 1986 Cum. Supp.). Beneficial uses are defined
to include but not to be limited to the reasonable and efficient use of water for
domestic, municipal, agricultural, industrial, commercial, power production, sub-
irrigation, fish and wildlife, ground water recharge, interstate compact require-
ments, water quality maintenance, or recreational purposes. Id& at § 46-288. The
public interest criteria were modified in 1986. Act approved April 18, 1986, 1986
Neb. Laws, LB 309 § 2 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. 46-289 (Cur. S upp. 1986)).
Now § 46-289 authorizes the DWR to grant an interbasin transfer appropriation
application if the benefits to the receiving basin and the state equal or exceed the
adverse impacts of the transfer to the state and the transferring basin. These
provisions are ambiguous regarding whether the benefits of the receiving basin
should be counted in the state benefits, i.e., whether the receiving basin benefits
(and the transferring basin adverse impacts) will be counted twice. See Aiken,
Nebraska Water Law Update No. 78 5-6 (Feb. 11, 1986) (Univ. of Neb. Dep't of Ag.
Econ.) (copy available from author upon request). Presumably this change is in-
tended to make it easier to obtain appropriation permits for interbasin transfers.
270. Little Blue Natural Resources Dist. v. Lower Platte North Natural Resources
Dist., 210 Neb. 862, 871-72, 317 N.W.2d 726, 732 (1982) (Little Blue II). See R.
HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, supra note 7, at 366-70.
271. NEB. REV. STAT. § 37-435(3) (1984). See supra notes 238-239 and accompanying
text.
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endangered species, and it therefore was not authorized to issue the
appropriation.
Little Blue I provided even more of a shock to project developers
than its predecessor. Most developers had come to oppose the prohibi-
tion of interbasin transfers,272 and thus were not disappointed with
Little Blue I (Platte basin project sponsors excepted of course). Little
Blue H was something entirely different. While project sponsors had
reluctantly realized that environmental considerations would come
into play when dealing with federal permits and funds for water
projects, environmental constraints had not intruded into state pro-
ceedings. No doubt sponsors expected that they would be able to ob-
tain an endangered species exemption should a water project violate
federal jeopardy requirements. At least such considerations were de-
cades away. Little Blue II changed the environmental complacency of
water developers: now they would have to contend with endangered
species protection in state appropriation proceedings. Although it was
not clear how the Game and Parks Commission would interpret the
NESA jeopardy requirements, developers were aware that the critical
whooping crane habitat had been designated in the central Platte re-
gion.273 The critical habit was, in turn, under the watchful eye of the
whooping crane trust. It was no longer business as usual when project
sponsors were applying for appropriations from a basically sympa-
thetic DWR. Water development in Nebraska had finally been thrust
into the modem world.
Based on the Little Blue II decision the Little Blue NRD formally
consulted with the Game and Parks Commission to determine the im-
pact of its project on endangered species or their critical habitat. The
Commission issued a biological opinion that unless the project were
substantially modified (and it could be inferred that such modifica-
tions were feasible) substantial interference with the critical habitat of
several endangered species would occur.27 4 The jeopardy opinion by
the Commission confirmed the worst fears of project sponsors and
brought water development in Nebraska to a standstill.
272. See R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, supra note 7, at 353.
273. See supra note 148.
274. NEBRASKA GAME & PARKS COMMISSION, BIOLOGICAL OPINION, LITTLE BLUE -
CATHERLAND PROJECT (1985). The Commission concluded that "the Little Blue-
Catherland project will jeopardize the continued existence of the whooping
crane, bald eagle, and the least tern.... To the best of our knowledge, there are
no reasonable or prudent alternatives that would avoid jeopardy should the Little
Blue-Catherland project with or without Prairie Bend be constructed and oper-
ated as currently proposed." I- at 6. The opinion did suggest that modifying
project operation and/or providing substitute water to compensate for diversions
could be used to avoid jeopardy. Id at 7-8.
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V. LB 1106
A. The Water Independence Congress
The Game and Parks Commission biological opinion was the coup
de grace that halted Nebraska surface water development at least tem-
porarily. The reasons for this stalemate included: (1) disagreements
about allocation of surface water between instream environmental
uses and out of stream uses (as reflected in the endangered species and
NEPA litigation), and a realization (in some quarters) that a mecha-
nism was needed to resolve such conflicts other than through litiga-
tion;275 (2) the belief that additional surface water development was
feasible and desirable, particularly to provide supplemental water to
irrigators depleting local ground water supplies; and (3) the realiza-
tion that state (or local) water project funding was required to com-
pensate for reduced federal financial assistance. These concerns led
Governor Kerrey to establish his Water Independence Congress on
May 26, 1983, to develop water policy recommendations for legislative
and gubernatorial consideration.276
The Congress submitted its final report to Governor Kerrey on De-
cember 7, 1983.277 Congressional recommendations included (1) le-
gally recognizing instream flows for fish, wildlife and ground water
recharge; (2) requiring natural resource districts to prepare ground
water management plans; (3) pursuing additional surface water im-
poundment; (4) amending the Nebraska Constitution to authorize
state general obligation bonds for impoundment projects; (5) authoriz-
ing state financial assistance for impoundments only when public and
private benefits exceed project costs; (6) requiring project benefi-
ciaries to pay their share of project costs based on the benefits re-
ceived;278 (7) establishing a Natural Resources director to replace the
275. Most irrigation interests persist in denying environmental instream water uses
any real legitimacy. This development bias will probably persist for some time.
It is unlikely that environmental interests would receive any legal protection in
Nebraska in the absence of federal environmental safeguards or judicial adoption
of the public trust doctrine. Regarding the latter, see R. HARNSBERGER & N.
THORSON, supra note 7, at 296-320.
276. Aiken, Nebraska Water Law Update No. 60 2-7 (Oct. 14, 1983) (Univ. of Neb. Ag.
Econ. Dep't) (copy available from author upon request). The author was a mem-
ber of the Water Congress.
277. NEBRASKA WATER INDEPENDENCE CONGRESS, FINAL REPORT (Dec. 7, 1983). The
author filed a dissenting opinion, and joined a dissenting opinion prepared by
Creighton University Law Professor Eric Pearson. Letter from J. David Aiken to
Governor Bob Kerrey (Dec. 14, 1983); Dissenting remarks of J. David Aiken and
Eric Pearson, members, Nebraska Water Independence Congress, Dec. 7, 1983
(copy available from author upon request). The author's dissent emphasized that
the Water Congress had avoided coming to grips with the reality of ground water
depletion and the limited effect of rescue projects to significantly affect depletion
rates statewide.
278. Most Water Congress members did not realize that in the absence of federal pro-
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Executive Director of the Natural Resources Commission; and (8) es-
tablishing a Water Management Board to review and approve pro-
posed major impoundments, as well as providing an administrative
forum for project conflict resolution. The recommendations of the
Congress represented a major victory for the Governor, who sought
increased political control over the Nebraska Natural Resources Com-
mission. In total, however, the recommendations largely sought to
maintain the status quo of seeking rescue projects at primarily federal
expense to maintain ground water-based irrigation. The instream
flow recommendation was only a gesture and did not reflect a political
consensus that environmental values were legitimate water policy
concerns. 279
B. The Governor's Bill
Based on the Congress's recommendations, Senator Loren Schmit
introduced LB 1106 for Governor Kerrey in the 1984 legislative ses-
sion. The original bill established a Water Management Board with
broad water project review authorities, established a director of Natu-
ral Resources to replace the Natural Resources Commission (NRC)
executive secretary, established a water management fund to provide
state funding for major water projects, authorized the NRC to obtain
instream appropriations, and required NRDs to prepare ground water
management plans. Portions of the Governor's bill were very contro-
versial, leading to significant committee amendments and a second
hearing. Each major portion of LB 1106 represented a significant
water policy change.
The first major change proposed by the Governor's bill was estab-
lishment of the Water Management Board (WMB). The purpose of
establishing the WVIB was to help resolve conflicts over water projects
ject cost sharing this recommendation would preclude irrigation projects in the
absence of sustained high crop prices, as irrigators typically can afford to pay only
a fraction of the cost of water from reclamation projects. See supra note 202.
However most Congress members assumed that federal water project subsidies
would be available, and that the state's share of project costs would not exceed
35%.
279. The instream flow recommendations were controversial and limited. The author
recalls a stormy meeting where he presented specific alternatives for granting
instream appropriations that had been prepared at the request of Congress Co-
Chairman John Cavanaugh. These proposals met violent opposition from agri-
cultural interests on the Congress, who stated rather forcefully that they were in
favor of going on record as supporting instream flows but would not favor going
the next step of actually allowing water to be legally allocated to instream flows.
The actual position was that instream flows were acceptable as long as the water
was not needed for agriculture, at which point agriculture would be entitled to all
the water it needed. This philosophy is reflected in the take-away provision of
the instream flow portions of LB 1106. See infra text accompanying notes 326-28.
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so development could occur.28 0 WMB authorities were not as contro-
versial as other features of the Governor's bill, and were not signifi-
cantly changed as LB 1106 was enacted.281 The WMB would have
included the Game and Parks director, the newly created director of
Natural Resources and one gubernatorial appointee with demon-
strated natural resources experience. 28 2 The WMB would have major
water project review responsibilities, including determining whether a
proposed project was consistent with NRC state water use goals; de-
termining whether a proposed project was technically, environmen-
tally, financially and economically feasible; attempting to resolve
project conflicts including the authority to modify project design and
operation; and determining whether a project was in the state's inter-
est.28 3 The WMB would also consult and make endangered species
determinations with Game and Parks for projects reviewed by the
WMB.284 Any project sponsor seeking state project planning assist-
280.
It is the intent of the Legislature that an organizational structure be es-
tablished within state government to identify, propose, support, advo-
cate, resolve conflicts regarding, and expedite water development
projects in the state in the most efficient manner possible. The Legisla-
ture further intends that the Water Management Board be the entity for
such purposes.
LB 1106 § 1, 88th Leg. 2nd Sess. (1984) (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-15.107
(Cum. Supp. 1986)) [hereinafter Governor's Bill].
281. Creation of the WMB was opposed, however, by the Nebraska Association of Re-
sources Districts, composed of state Natural Resource Districts. Hearings on LB
1106 Before the Committee on Public Works 31 (1984) (statement of Gordon Kis-
sel) [hereinafter Governor's Bill Hearing]. The WMB was also opposed by the
Natural Resource Commission, the Nebraska Farm Bureau Federation and three
NRDs. Id. at 40, 41 (statement of Clinton VonSeggren, Neb. Natural Resources
Comm'n), 56 (statement of Bruce Neidig, Neb. Farm Bureau Federation), 64
(statement of Steve Oltmans, Lower Elkhorn NRD), 66 (statement of Paul Mann,
Upper Elkhorn NRD), 72 (statement of Mel Sahs, Lower Platte North NRD).
282. Governor's Bill, supra note 280, § 2, at 1, 2 (codified as amended at NEB. REV.
STAT. § 2-15.108 (Cum. Supp. 1986)).
283. Id. § 4, at 4 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-15,110 (Cum. Supp. 1986)).
284. Id. § 5, at 4 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-15,111 (Cum. Supp. 1986)). See also id.
§ 21, at 22, 23 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 37-435(2) (1984 Cum.Supp.)). Section
5 of the Governor's Bill was intended to clarify an ambiguity created in Little
Blue Natural Resources Dist. v. Lower Platte North Natural Resources Dist., 210
Neb. 862, 317 N.W.2d 726 (1982). In that case the Supreme Court ruled that state
agencies were required to consult with the Game and Parks Commission under
NEB. REV. STAT.§ 37-435(3) (Cum. Supp. 1984) and that NRDs were state agen-
cies. This ruling is clearly wrong: NRDs are political subdivisions, not state agen-
cies. The issue addressed by § 5, however, was that multiple Game and Parks
endangered species consultations would have been present in any event and the
Little Blue ruling only increased the number of formal consultations involved.
Section 5 attempts to resolve this by having the WMB engage in a single endan-
gered species consultation for a project, and by not requiring an additional consul-
tation when the DWR rules on a project's application. However, this presumes
that the WMB will determine the final form of the project, which is not necessar-
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ance, state financial support, state advocacy assistance, or for an ap-
propriation exceeding either 10,000 acre feet per year or ten cubic feet
per second285 of natural flow would be required to submit their project
to the WMB.286 Project sponsors with appropriation applications al-
ready filed with the DWR would be authorized but not required to file
with the WM B.287 If the determinations made by the WMB were
favorable, and Game and Parks endangered species consultation was
successful, the WMB would be authorized to support and financially
participate in the proposed project.288 If the proposed project were
not economically feasible, but otherwise met project approval require-
ments, the WMB could not oppose water rights being obtained for the
proposed project.28 9 If the WMB determined that the project did not
meet approval requirements, the WMB would be required to oppose
any appropriation even if the project were economically feasible.290
The DWR director would be authorized, but not required, to refer ap-
propriation applications to the WVIB for its evaluation.291
The project approval authorities of the WVIB, which were enacted
without substantial change, were substantial. Because state political
support is indispensable to obtain federal project funding, WMB ap-
proval carries substantial weight.292 Moreover, the WMB was given
broad authorities to force a compromise on project sponsors and oppo-
ily the case. See infra text accompanying notes 335-39. Thus multiple consulta-
tions on a project may be justified where the project, and especially its
endangered species effects, have been modified. As the endangered species ef-
fects are likely to be among the most controversial features of any Platte River
water project, project modification to avoid jeopardy seems likely.
285. One cubic foot of water equals 7.48 gallons. One cubic foot per second (cfs) equals
448.8 gallons of water per minute. HARNSBERGER & THORSON, supra note 7, at 7-8.
286. Governor's Bill, supra note 280, § 8, at 5, (codified as amended at NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 2-15,114(1) (Cum. Supp. 1986)).
287. Id § 8, at 5 (codified as amended at NEB. REv. STAT. 2-15,114(2) (Cur. Supp.
1986)).
288. Id- § 10(2), at 6 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. 2-15,116(2) (Cum. Supp. 1986)).
289. Id § 10(3), at 6 (codified as amended at NEB. REV. STAT. 2-15,116(2) (1986
Cum.Supp.)).
290. Id § 10(4), at 6 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. 2-15,116(2) (Cum. Supp. 1986)).
291. Id- § 35, at 30, 31 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-209 (1984)).
292. A good illustration is the Norden project on the Niobrara River. The original
Bureau of Reclamation project was delayed through litigation. See supra text
accompanying notes 97-101. Subsequently project opponents were able to con-
vince Congressman Cavanaugh and later Congressman Bereuter to withdraw
support for the project. Ultimately supporters were able to obtain a political re-
evaluation of the project including consideration of an irrigation water supply
project that would not dam the Niobrara river. NEB. DEP'T OF WATER RE-
souRcEs, NEBRASKA STATE-LED O'NEiLL UNIT ALTERNATIVES STUDY (1985).
While the fate of the Norden project is unclear, it is likely that if any irrigation
supply project is implemented it will be the alternative plan rather than the origi-
nal Norden dam. Given the uncertainty regarding federal and state project fund-
ing, the lack of political unanimity means that even a substitute may never be
implemented. See supra note 86.
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nents. As Governor Kerrey noted in his testimony, LB 1106 was in-
tended to get water projects proposals moving towards completion
rather than being tied up in environmental and water rights litiga-
tion.293 Moreover, as Congress Co-Chairman John Cavanaugh noted,
the WMB was intended to sort through all project proposals, and to
recommend project funding priorities to the Unicameral. 294 However,
the projects currently involved in the Platte River war have already
filed their appropriations applications and would be beyond the
WMB's review.2 95 Thus, the DWR would continue to be the battle-
ground for Platte River projects unless either the DWR referred the
applications to the WMB, or the Governor insisted that WMB ap-
proval be obtained before the state provide any tangible assistance to
water project sponsors. Neither has proved to be the case.
The second major innovation proposed in the Governor's bill was
the establishment of the Director of Natural Resources (DNR). Under
existing law the NRC, the water planning agency for the state and
focal point for water development promotion, was headed by an exec-
utive secretary appointed by it.296 As the NRC is dominated by river
basin representatives elected by local NRDs,297 the executive director
was perceived as being politically accountable to the NRDs. As NRD
directors are elected by subdistrict rather than on the basis of popula-
tion,298 NRDs and the NRC have a pro-development philosophy. LB
1106 proposed to eliminate the NRC executive secretary position and
create the DNR as a gubernatorial appointee subject to confirmation
by two-thirds of the NRC.299 The DNR also could be removed by a
two-thirds NRC vote.300
This proposal was very controversial, as it essentially shifted NRC
control from NRDs to the Governor. Proponents of the DNR argued
that for the Governor to support increased appropriations for water
development and to be able to take the political heat for those in-
creased appropriations, the Governor needed greater political control
over the water development process.301 Opponents charged that gu-
bernatorial appointment of the DNR would politicize water develop-
293. Governor's Bill Hearing, supra note 281, at 2 (statement of Gov. Bob Kerrey).
294. Id. at 17 (statement of John Cavanaugh). Mr. Cavanaugh was the Governor's
representative on, and Co-Chairman of, the Water Congress.
295. See Platte Projects Summary, supra note 226.
296. There were no statutory references to the administrative head of the NRC. How-
ever, the NRC has general authority to hire employees. NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-1506
(1983).
297. Id- at § 2-1504.
298. See supra note 233.
299. Governor's Bill, supra note 280, § 12, at 8, 9 (codified as amended at NEB. REV.
STAT. § 2-1504.03 (Cum. Supp. 1986)).
300. Id
301. Governor's Bill Hearing, supra note 281, at 7 (statement of Gov. Bob Kerrey), 15-
17 (statement of John Cavanaugh, Water Congress Co-Chairman).
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ment and weaken local control over water development policies.302
Gubernatorial appointment of the DNR was one issue that was signifi-
cantly modified by committee amendment.
The third major feature of LB 1106 was the Water Management
Fund, from which the WMB could provide cost sharing for up to 75%
of a water project's cost.3 0 3 Section 16 further limited NRC grants
from the existing Resources Development Fund to $10 million dollars,
limiting NRDF grants to smaller projects and giving the WMB (rather
than the NRC) control over state cost sharing for major irrigation
projects.3 04 LB 1106 contained no source of funding for the Water
Management Fund, however, suggesting that appropriations would be
made for specific projects on a case by case basis as recommended by
the WMIB.305
The fourth major feature of LB 1106 was authorization of instream
appropriations. Nebraska had not yet adopted instream flow legisla-
tion,3 06 and the issue is still controversial. The LB 1106 approach to
instream flows can only be described as cautious. Under the Gover-
nor's bill, instream appropriations could be obtained from the DWR by
the NRC for fish and wildlife purposes only.307 NRDs and the Game
and Parks Commission would nominate stream segments to the NRC
which had "critical needs" for instream flow protection.30 8 After a
public hearing, the NRC would file an appropriation application with
the DWR to reserve a priority date.3 0 9 The NRC then would study the
proposed instream appropriation to identify whether it could be sup-
plied solely from unappropriated natural flow, from existing reser-
voirs or from new reservoirs.310 After the study, the NRC would
request that the DWR proceed with the instream appropriation appli-
cation only if the NRC determined that sufficient unappropriated nat-
302. Id. at 31 (statement of Gordon Kissel, Neb. Ass'n of Resources Districts), 36
(statement of Clinton VonSeggren, Neb. Natural Resources Comm'n), 64 (state-
ment of Steve Oltmans, Lower Elkhorn NRD), 65 (statement of Paul Mann, Up-
per Elkhorn NRD), 72 (statement of Mel Sahs, Lower Platte North NRD).
303. Governor's Bill, supra note 280, § 15, at 13 (codified as amended at NEB. REV.
STAT. 2-15,117 (Cum. Supp. 1986)).
304. Id. § 16, at 14, 15 (codified as amended at NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-1588 (Cum. Supp.
1986)) (transferred from NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-3265 (1983)).
305. Governor's Bill Hearing, supra note 281, at 17 (statement of John Cavanaugh,
Water Independence Congress Co-Chairman).
306. Regarding legal aspects of instream flows in Nebraska, see, J. AHEN, OPPORTUNI-
TIES FOR INSTREAM FLows Iw NEBRASKA AND KANSAS (U.S. Fish & Wildlife Ser-
vice 1983); HARNSBERGER & THORSON, supra note 7, at 315-20; Comment,
Minimum Streamflows: The Legislative Alternatives, 57 NEB. L. REV. 704 (1978).
307. Governor's Bill, supra note 280, § 23, at 12, 13; (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-
2,108 (1984)).
308. Id § 24, at 24 (codified at NB. REv. STAT. § 46-2,109 (1984)).
309. Id. § 24-25, at 24, 25 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-2,109 to -2,110 (1984)).
310. Id § 26, at 25 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-2,111 (1984)) repealed by 1985 Neb.
Laws, LB 102 § 22, at 13 (1985).
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ural flow were available for appropriation.3 1 1 If the NRC determined
that sufficient unappropriated flow were not available, the appropria-
tion application would be abandoned, and the NRD would instead co-
operate with the NRDs or the Game and Parks to establish the water
storage necessary to provide water for instream flows. 312 After a pub-
lic hearing, the DWR could grant the instream appropriation if the
appropriation is necessary to sustain fish and wildlife, the appropria-
tion would not interfere with senior appropriations, the rate and tim-
ing of flow is the minimum necessary to sustain fish and wildlife, and
the state benefits from granting the appropriation equal or outweigh
the benefits from denying the appropriation. 313
The instream flow proposal was controversial. Developers opposed
the concept of instream flows. 314 Environmentalists were unsatisfied
because of the cumbersome procedures required and because the
water-development-prone NRC was the agency seeking the instream
appropriations.31 5 It seemed unlikely that the NRC would seek an in-
stream appropriation where it would conflict with a proposed water
project. But LB 1106 generated additional controversy by inserting in-
stream flows into the water preferences statutes,316 and failing to give
agriculture a preference over instream flows. Instead the Governor's
bill put instream flows and agriculture on an equal basis so that
neither use could be condemned by the other.317 This provision of the
instream flow proposal generated the most negative comments at the
hearing on the Governor's bill.318 The instream flow provisions of LB
311. Id. § 27, at 25, 26 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-2,112 (1984)) repealed by 1985
Neb. Laws, LB 102 § 22, at 26.
312. Id. § 28, at 26 (codified at NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-2,113 (1984)) repealed by 1985 Neb.
Laws, LB 102 § 22, at 13.
313. Id. §§ 29-30 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-2,114 to -2,115 (1984)). In making
the state benefit determination, the DWR director would consider the economic,
social and environmental value of the instream uses versus those of reasonably
foreseeable out-of-stream uses. Id. at § 31 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-2,116
(1984)).
314. Governor's Bill Hearing, supra note 281, at 37-38 (statement of Clinton VonSeg-
gren, Neb. Natural Resources Comm'n).
315. Id. at 34 (statement of Francis Moul, Neb. Wildlife Federation), 52 (statement of
Phil James, Neb. Water Conservation Council).
316. Water preferences are one of the most misunderstood features of prior appropria-
tion. The surface water preference ordering in Nebraska prefers domestic over
all other uses, and agricultural uses are preferred over industrial and manufac-
turing uses. The legal effect of a preference is that a junior preferred user (i.e., a
junior appropriator with a higher preference) can condemn a senior inferior use
(i.e., a senior appropriation for a less preferred purpose). Most do not understand
that exercising a preference involves compensating the inferior user. See NEB.
NATURAL RESOURCES COMM'N, PREFERENCES TO THE USE OF WATER (1981);
Fischer, Harnsberger & Oeltjen, supra note 12, at 356-57.
317. Governor's Bill, supra note 280, § 34, at 28, 29.
318. Governor's Bill Hearing, supra note 283, at 57 (statement of Bryce Neidig, Neb.
Farm Bureau), 60 (statement of Rich Martin, Neb. Ass'n of Commerce & Indus-
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1106 were substantially revised in the Committee amendments.
The last component of the Governor's bill required all NRDs in
which ground water control or management areas had not already
been designated to prepare ground water management plans by Janu-
ary 1, 1986.319 As discussed earlier, the purpose of the plan was to
identify any likely ground water depletion or pollution problems and
to identify what regulations would be necessary. On the one hand, LB
1106 stopped short of requiring NRDs facing ground water depletion
to establish effective control programs as a condition of state financial
support for rescue projects. However, requiring all NRDs to prepare
the plans was a significant step away from the traditional local control
approach to ground water management. The proposal was opposed
only by the NRC, which preferred a more modest program requiring
NRDs to inventory existing supplies and concerns, but stop short of
considering alternatives to deal with those concerns. 320
The Governor's bill was a significant water policy proposal of his-
toric proportions. The WIB's project review authorities would ide-
ally allow project disputes to be resolved prior to obtaining an
appropriation, thus avoiding costly environmental and water rights lit-
igation. The instream flow provisions held the promise that environ-
mental values could be protected through instream appropriations and
would not need to be raised on a project by project basis through en-
dangered species or section 404 litigation. However, LB 1106 con-
tained significant gaps and created new problems. The status of
proposed projects for which appropriations had already been sought
vis-a-vis the WMB was ambiguous. While project sponsors presuma-
bly would be required to apply for WMB approval to obtain state plan-
ning, financial or advocacy assistance, the provision giving them the
option of ignoring WM approval if they had already filed with the
DWR clouded this. Moreover, the WMB's authority to consult and
make determinations with the Game and Parks Commission regarding
endangered species unnecessarily suggested that jeopardy determina-
tions will be made jointly by the WIVIB and the Game and Parks
rather than by Game and Parks alone. Finally, the instream appropri-
ation requirements made the protection accorded to environmental
values in water more illusory than real. It seems unlikely that envi-
ronmental interests would forego delaying litigation in the hope that
try). The controversy over the instream flow preferences reflected the general
misunderstanding of the preferences concept, as was correctly recognized by
John Cavanaugh. Id- at 12-13. That is, junior agricultural users were unlikely to
be able to afford to condemn senior instream uses and vice versa unless Game and
Parks were authorized to condemn senior appropriations for instream purposes.
319. Governor's Bill, supra note 280, § 36, at 32 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-673.01
(1984)).
320. Governor's Bill Heaing, supra note 281, at 31 (statement of Clinton VonSeggren,
Neb. Natural Resources Com'n).
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the state's water development agency would obtain an instream
appropriation.
C. The Committee's Bill
Controversy over the organizational changes proposed in the Gov-
ernor's bill and continuing irrigator opposition to instream flows led to
significant committee amendments and an unusual second public
hearing. The committee amendments modified the DNR appointment
procedures, expanded the W1VIB membership, removed the prefer-
ences language for instream flows, added a take-away provision for
instream flows, and provided funding for ground water management
plan preparation.3 21
The Governor's bill would have allowed the Governor to appoint
the DNR subject to NRC confirmation. The Committee bill proposed
instead that the NRC would present the Governor with a list of at
least five nominees from which the Governor would make his choice.
The DNR would serve at the pleasure of the Governor, and could not
be removed by the NRC.322 This modification was opposed by the
NRC and NRDs, as was the original DNR provision.323
The Committee bill expanded the membership of the WMB. Under
the Governor's bill the WMB would have included the director of
Game and Parks, the DNR, and a gubernatorial appointment with
demonstrated natural resources experience. The Committee bill ex-
panded the WMB to include the director of the Conservation and Sur-
vey Division of the University of Nebraska, the Game and Parks
director, the DNR, and two gubernatorial appointees, both with natu-
ral resources experience and one an expert in water project develop-
ment and management. 324 There was no remaining opposition to the
WMB.325
321. NRDs could apply for state funds if the costs of ground water management plan
preparation exceeded 25% of the operating budget for the district. Committee on
Public Works, Committee Amendments to LB 1106 sec. 37 (AM2257, 1984) [here-
inafter Committee Bill]; cf. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-673.01 (1984).
322. Id. § 12 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-15,108). If the governor did not make the
DNR appointment within 45 days of the receipt of the NRC list, the NRC would
make the appointment. If the NRC did not submit a list of nominees to the gov-
ernor within 45 days, the governor would make the appointment. Id.
323. Committee on Public Works, LB 1106 Committee Amendments Hearing (Feb. 23,
1984) at 46 (statement of Gordon Kissel, Neb. Ass'n of Resources Districts), 47-48
(statement of Clinton VonSeggren, Neb. Natural Resources Comm'n), 50 (state-
ment of Wayne Warner, North Platte NRD), 55-56 (statement of Ken Regier,
Upper Big Blue NRD), 66-67 (statement of Don Hood, Nemaha NRD) [hereinaf-
ter Committee Bill Hearing].
324. Committee BilM4 supra note 321, § 2 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-15,108 (Cum.
Supp. 1986)).
325. Committee Bill Hearing, supra note 323, at 45 (statement of Gordon Kissel, Neb.
Ass'n of Resources Districts).
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The instream flow provision of the Committee bill added a take-
away provision to render the potential instream appropriations even
more insecure. Under the Committee bill, the WMB would be re-
quired to review instream appropriations if the appropriations poten-
tially interfered with an irrigation project submitted for WMB review.
The WMB would determine whether the interest of the state required
modification of the instream appropriation. The DWR would be au-
thorized to legally modify the instream appropriation as recom-
mended by the WMB, although the DWR director could elect not to
modify the appropriation. Modification could include reducing the vol-
ume or rate approved for the instream appropriation. 326 This provi-
sion largely nullified whatever instream flow protection could be
obtained through an instream appropriation, and reflected the contin-
uing hostility to instream flows on the part of water development in-
terests. The take-away provisions were opposed by environmental
groups. 327 The Committee bill also did not include the instream flow
preference provision of the Governor's bill.328
The Committee amendments made the Governor's bill more ac-
ceptable to water development interests, and in so doing made LB
1106 less attractive to environmentalists.29 Opposition by water de-
velopers (and by Senator Schmit) probably could have killed any
chance of enactment, so the Committee amendments probably were
politically necessary to get a bill enacted.
D. LB 1106
The Unicameral enacted the Committee bill, and added water pro-
ject revenue bonding3 30 The final bill gave the DNR rather than the
326. Committee Bil supra note 321, § 34 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-2,117
(1984)).
327. Committee Bill Hearing, supra note 323, at 17 (statement of MAike Dennis, Neb.
Water Conservation Council). Natural flow instream flow appropriations were
opposed by the Nebraska Water Resources Association, a water development as-
sociation. MdL at 34 (statement of Jack Odgaard).
328. Committee Bill supra note 321, § 35 (codified at NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-2,119
(1984)).
329. The Nebraska environmental lobby has never been strong, in part because no
commercial interests are served thereby. Indeed, the Water Congress and L;B
1106 would have ignored instream flows completely were not environmental val-
ues protected through the federal § 404 and FESA programs. If Nebraska had
instream appropriations which protected significant environmental values § 404,
NESA, and FESA litigation over water projects would be sharply reduced. If in-
stream flows had greater commercial significance, e.g., for outdoor recreation,
Nebraska probably would have had instream flow legislation years ago.
330. 1984 Neb. Laws, LB 1106, 88th Leg., 2d Sess. The revenue bonding program is at
§§ 44-71 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 2-4501 to -4528 (Cum. Supp. 1986)). Reve-
nue bonding allows project operators to issue bonds based on future project reve-
nues, such as from water sales to irrigators. Water project revenue bonds were
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NRC the responsibility for establishing state water use goals, with
which the WMB would evaluate proposed water projects.3 31 The final
bill substituted a $10 million figure for the water diversion volume
requirements as the project size threshold for WMB project review
authority.332 The purposes for which instream appropriations could
be acquired were broadened from fish and wildlife to also include
recreation.333
The WMB project review function was amended in 1985 to require
existing projects seeking state advocacy for federal construction fund-
ing, or Water Management Fund planning or construction grants to be
reviewed by the WMB.334 This provision brought existing projects
within the WMB's jurisdiction, although the point at which that oc-
curred could apparently be delayed as long as state water planning
assistance was not requested. Under this amendment, projects for
which appropriations had been filed prior to the effective date of LB
1106, February 15, 1985,335 need not apply for WMB approval until
they request state planning assistance, which could be delayed until
after project water rights had been obtained from the DWR.336 If they
forego state planning assistance altogether, project sponsors with pre-
LB 1106 appropriation filings need file with the WMB only when they
request state construction grants or state advocacy for federal con-
struction grants, which would occur long after project water rights
had been obtained.33 7 The result is that the WMB will not review
projects with pre-LB 1106 appropriation filings before the project ap-
propriations are considered by the DWR, but will review all post-LB
1106 projects before project sponsors can file with the DWR for water
appropriations. All major Platte River projects have pre-LB 1106 ap-
authorized by constitutional amendment in 1982. NEB. CONST.art. XIII § 1 (1985).
Revenue bonds do not represent direct public subsidies of water projects.
331. 1984 Neb. Laws, LB 1106, 88th Leg., 2d Sess. § 7 (codified as amended at NEB.
REV. STAT. § 2-15,113(1) (Cum. Supp. 1986)). Section § 2-15,113 was amended in
1985; the DNR proposes state water use goals to the NRC, which accepts, modi-
fies, or rejects them. See 1985 Neb. Laws, LB 102, 89th Leg., 1st Sess. 5. The NRC
may also request the DNR to modify the state water use goals. Id (codified at
NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-15,113(2) (Cum. Supp. 1986)).
332. Id § 8 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-15,114(1) (Cum. Supp. 1986)).
333. Id § 24 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-2,108 ( Cum. Supp. 1986)). However, the
DWR director may consider municipal ground water recharge and water quality
maintenance from instream flows in considering instream appropriation applica-
tions. Id § 32(1) (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-2,116(1) (Cum. Supp. 1986)).
334. 1985 Neb. Laws, LB 1106, 88th Leg., 1st Sess. §§ 5, 6 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 2-15,114(2), 15,116(2) (Cum. Supp. 1986)). A less formal WM project review is
required to obtain state advocacy for federal planning funds. Id § 2-15,116(3).
However, pre-LB 1106 projects routinely obtain state advocacy for federal plan-
ning assistance without first obtaining § 2-15,116(3) WIB approval.
335. Id. § 72.
336. NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-15,114(1) (Cum. Supp. 1986).
337. Id § 2-15,116(2).
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propriation filings.33 8 Thus, the result of the 1985 amendment is to
clearly signal that the WMB will be on the sidelines during the cur-
rent Platte River wars unless project sponsors voluntarily submit to
WIVIB project review pursuant to section 2-15,144(3), or the DWR vol-
untarily refers appropriation applications to the WMB pursuant to
section 46-209. Neither action is likely, so the WMVIB will be merely a
paper tiger.
The instream flow provisions were also amended in 1985 to delete
the NRC instream flow study requirements339 and to authorize the
Game and Parks Commission and NRDs to apply for instream appro-
priations rather than the NRC.340 However, the take-away provisions
remain, as well as the restrictions that natural flow instream appropri-
ations may be granted only if sufficient unappropriated natural flow is
available to completely satisfy the instream flow requirements.3 4 1
VI. NEW DIRECTIONS IN NEBRASKA WATER POLICY?
LB 1106 represented a good faith political attempt to establish a
mechanism to resolve the environmental and water rights controver-
sies attending Platte River development. However, the water project
management system it established is unlikely ultimately to succeed.
Water developers insist (1) that local control be preserved, (2) that
instream flows be accommodated only when they would not limit
water development options, (3) that significant state funding be pro-
vided for water projects with no conditions, and (4) that ground water
regulations not be established. These values are reflected throughout
LB 1106. Until these positions change, there will be no progress in
reaching a broader consensus on Platte River water allocation, and de-
cisions will continue to be made through litigation. Political leaders
should persuade water developers that they must accommodate a
broader set of political and environmental values in order to accom-
plish their objectives. If they fail to do so, developers run the risk that
when they finally succumb to current fiscal, environmental, and polit-
338. See PLATTE PROJECTS SUMMARY, supra note 226.
339. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-2,111 to -2,113 (1984) (repealed by 1985 Neb. Laws, LB 102
§ 22).
340. 1985 Neb. Laws, LB 102 § 15 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-1,110 (Cum. Supp.
1986)).
341. This means that instream appropriations must either be satisfied completely
from natural flow or completely from storage. Natural flow instream appropria-
tions cannot be issued where the flows come both from natural flow and from
storage. This curious legal discrimination against instream appropriations makes
no sense at all: all modern irrigation projects depend on both natural flow and
stored water to meet their water supply objectives. Precluding instream appro-
priations to be met both from natural flow and stored water is only another ex-
ample of the legislative hostility to instream flows.
1987]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
ical realities via the blunt instruments of litigation and political defeat,
it will be too late to salvage any of their original objectives.
The more significant issue is whether a rescue project policy, the
preservation of which was the major objective of LB 1106, is itself
doomed to failure. If water developers do become more politically ac-
commodating in order to realize some of their objectives, will they
have achieved anything substantial? The answer is no: a policy of
ground water management policy through impoundment will provide
water to only a small fraction of those irrigators facing depletion. This
does not mean, however, that LB 1106 and the public policy issues it
represents are of no consequence. Rather, policy makers must be
careful to guard against impoundment policies that unnecessarily
jeopardize our environment and threaten our state's financial capaci-
ties, while failing to significantly extend the life of ground water-
based irrigation in Nebraska.
A. Director of Natural Resources: Gubernatorial Involvement in Water
Policy Making
The only significant legislative challenge to LB 1106 has been the
passage of LB 778 in 1986. Under LB 778, the DNR would have been
appointed by the NRC rather than the Governor. Governor Kerrey
vetoed LB 778, thus preserving the governor's more direct involve-
ment in state water policy making.342 The passage of LB 778 reflects
the strong political sentiment in favor of local control. Yet insistence
on local control ignores the fact that if the Governor is not directly
involved in water development policy making, he will not be willing to
support the appropriations necessary to build water projects. Water
developers are unwilling to accept that local responsibility comes with
local control-if local irrigators are unwilling to forego local control
over water development policies they must be ready to finance water
development themselves. At this point, irrigators have not accepted
that responsibility. They insist on maintaining local political control
over water development decisions but expect the state to provide
whatever funding is needed to accomplish these local objectives. If
local control parochialism is allowed to dominate water policy deci-
sions, water project development in Nebraska will not occur. If water
developers expect significant state financial support for water
projects, they will have to relinquish local control over water develop-
ment policies and begin to view water issues in a less parochial
fashion.
342. NEB. LEG. J. 1864 (1986). The bill originally proposing to give the DNR appoint-
ment authority to the NRC was LB 920, which was added to LB 778 by floor
amendment.
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B. Water Management Board: Accommodating Competing Projects
and Values
Under LB 1106 projects with pre-LB 1106 appropriation filings are
grandfathered out of WMB water project review. Neither the DWR
nor grandfathered project sponsors have shown any indication to sub-
mit to WVIB project review. 343 Unless the Governor can persuade the
parties to submit to WVIB arbitration, or unless LB 1106 is amended,
the WMB will have no significant role in the current Platte River
water war.
A recent University of Nebraska study indicates what optimally
could be achieved with WMB water project review. The study evalu-
ated differing water allocations to the Central Platte, Little Blue, and
Upper Big Blue projects (the three major Platte River project propos-
als), plus maintenance of instream flows. The study concluded that
maximum economic benefits would occur if all three projects could be
built at a smaller scale than currently proposed.344 This conclusion
supports the notion that a negotiated settlement on the Platte would
yield greater irrigation benefits than would the project-by-project de-
termination which is currently occurring. The study also concluded
that the environmental-irrigation trade-offs would be less than is gen-
erally presumed; while the instream flow regimes defined by the
Game and Parks Commission as necessary to avoid jeopardy would
reduce the water available for diversion, the economic benefits lost
would be relatively small.345 If this is recognized by developers, the
likelihood for a negotiated settlement between environmental inter-
ests and developers improves. Finally, the study estimated that con-
structing the projects could be financed by user fees if irrigators and
ground water recharge beneficiaries were charged between 30-60% of
the economic benefits received. Capital construction needs could be
met through relatively modest annual appropriations of less than $15
million annually, solely through revenue bonds, or through a combi-
nation of the two. 346 While the results from the Platte River study are
almost too good to be true, they do suggest that compromises are avail-
able that would accommodate most, if not all, competing values. The
possibility of such alternatives suggest that WMB arbitration should
be pursued if developers and policy makers truly wish to develop the
Platte.
However, even in the best of circumstances, Platte River develop-
343. The possibility exists, however, that the parties could negotiate a compromise pri-
vately and then submit the compromise to the WMB for ratification.
344. A. BLEED, N. GOLLEHON, D. RAZAVIAN & R. SUPALLA, ECONOMIC, ENVIRONMEN-
TAL AND FINANCING OPTIMIZATION ANALYSIS OF PLATTE RIVER DEVELOPMENT
ALTERNATIVES 161 (Univ. of Neb. Conservation & Survey Div., June 1986).
345. I& at 162.
346. I& at 163-65.
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ment would be extremely controversial. Major water project develop-
ment was intensely controversial long before endangered species
considerations appeared on the water policy horizon. The opponents
to Tri-County development, the last major Platte River water war,
were competing project sponsors, downstream water interests, and lo-
cal landowners facing condemnation. Much of this opposition is an
inescapable part of major water project development. However,
forced project negotiations through the WMAB could resolve many of
the environmental disputes and intra-project disputes. If only that
were accomplished, it probably would be enough to insure implemen-
tation of the compromise.
C. Water Management Fund: Financing Water Development
While the WMB is authorized to provide up to 75% funding for
major water projects from the Water Management Fund, the fund it-
self is empty. Thus, a major issue is how the state will obtain the
funding necessary either to qualify for federal water project cost shar-
ing assistance, or to finance projects on its own. Projects could be
funded on a project-by-project basis. This would force a project-by-
project appraisal, a broader political accommodation of state-wide in-
terests, and probably would make project financing more difficult. It
is difficult to imagine the Nebraska Unicameral approving a direct
water project appropriation for $150 to $300 million in the near future.
A second approach is to earmark funds, e.g., a one-percent sales
tax, for water development. Again, with the current financial difficul-
ties in the agricultural community it is difficult to imagine the Uni-
cameral authorizing a state-wide tax to help only a relatively few
agricultural producers. This approach would also bypass the political
scrutiny entailed in direct legislative appropriations for each project.
A third approach, as suggested in the University of Nebraska
Platte River study, would be revenue bonds. This option is already
available, and would be the fairest way to finance projects since they
would be paid for primarily through user fees. Agriculture would
need to be more profitable than it is now, however, for this approach
to make economic sense.
The absence of a funding mechanism is no real hindrance to water
development. It would be foolish to undergo the political cost in-
volved in adopting a water financing mechanism when development is
still the subject of intense litigation and debate with little sign of com-
promise or consensus.
D. Instream Flows and Endangered Species
A basic cause of the current Platte River water wars is the failure
of the Nebraska appropriation system to reliably allocate water to in-
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stream uses. If Nebraska's appropriation system included recognition
of instream uses, NESA, FESA, and section 404 litigation would be
less of a threat to water project implementation. If instream uses are
not accommodated in water development proposals, water projects
will be subject to costly, disruptive and delaying environmental litiga-
tion at state and federal levels.
An interesting question is whether NESA will ultimately be inter-
preted by the Nebraska Supreme Court as limiting appropriations. In
Little Blue II Chief Justice Krivosha suggested in dictum that the
jeopardy provisions of NESA might interfere with the state constitu-
tional right to divert unappropriated water in Nebraska.347 This dic-
tum ignores the fact that the constitutional right to divert conditioned
by the public interest, which could be defined in part through
NESA.348 However, in view of the source, the suggestion that the
NESA jeopardy provision may be unconstitutional is worth exploring.
If section 37-435(3) is unconstitutional as applied to appropriation
of unappropriated water, then the endangered species issue would
merely be deferred to the federal level. When project sponsors apply
for a section 404 permit they will face the same endangered species
issues they had managed to avoid at the state level. Project sponsors
might expect to receive an endangered species exemption, but that
would require at least, a good faith effort on the part of project spon-
sors to avoid jeopardy, something project sponsors have been loath to
do to date.34 9 If, however, section 37-435(3) is interpreted as prohibit-
ing appropriations that jeopardize endangered species or their critical
habitat, water developers would likely propose to either repeal NESA
or to amend it to include an exemption process. If the exemption pro-
cess were modeled after the federal system, project sponsors would
still be required to make a good faith effort to avoid jeopardy and to
mitigate habitat disruption they caused.
A recent DWR ruling, which will lead to Little Blue III, suggests
that NESA indeed may not significantly influence Platte River appro-
priation decisions. In that order, the DWR director determined that
the effect of the Little Blue project on endangered species habitat was
not significant, despite the Game and Parks opinion to the contrary.350
While a thorough analysis of this order is beyond the scope of this
Article, it is worth noting that treating the Game and Parks Commis-
sion as a witness and its biological opinion as mere testimony probably
347. Little Blue Natural Resources Dist. v. Lower Platte North Natural Resources
Dist., 210 Neb. 862, 874, 317 N.W.2d 726, 733 (1982).
348. NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 6.
349. Regarding the FESA exemption process, see supra text accompanying notes 176-
86.
350. In re Applications A-15145, A-15146, A-15147 & A-15148 assigned to the Cather-
land Reclamation District, Dept. of Water Resources, July 29, 1986 (order of
approval).
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does not constitute consultation as required by section 37-435(3).351
E. Ground Water Management v. Rescue Projects
One of the underlying justifications for LB 1106's aggressive sup-
port of surface water development is the notion that impoundments
("rescue projects") are needed to sustain ground water based irriga-
tion in the face of ground water depletion. This justification assumes
that most if not all of current ground water irrigation development
can be maintained through rescue projects. This assertion does not
bear close scrutiny.
University of Nebraska scientist Ray Bentall has estimated that ap-
proximately 300,000 acre feet of Platte river water are reliably avail-
able for development.3 52 However, this is far less than the major
projects propose to use. Prairie Bend-Twin Valley would use 387,100
acre feet, Landmark would use 300,000 acre feet and Catherland
would use 125,000 acre feet.353 Even assuming that only half the water
impounded is consumed through evapotranspiration and other una-
voidable losses, this is still far less water than is available. One under-
stands why project sponsors are competing so vigorously for project
appropriations.
Moreover, the High Plains Study estimates that in the central
Platte and Blue River basins approximately 788,000 ground water irri-
gated acres will revert to dryland production by 2020 if ground water
withdrawals are not regulated.354 Even if all three proposed major
projects are fully implemented they will supply water only for an esti-
mated 272,000 acres, far less than the total loss of irrigated acres for
the region. The number of acres converted from ground water irriga-
tion water supply to impounded surface water supply is even less:
176,000 acres. Thus full irrigation development of the Platte, if that
were possible, would supply supplemental water for less than a quar-
ter of the areas threatened with reversion to dryland production. The
supply benefits of these three major projects, at an estimated cost of
$827.5 million, are much less than is generally appreciated.3 5 5
351. Moreover, in discussing the possible effect of the project on the endangered
whooping crane the order notes the lack of specific information gauging the ef-
fects of flow reductions on crane habitat, but nonetheless concludes that it is "in-
conceivable" that the Little Blue project would affect the whooping crane or its
critical habitat. I& at 10, 15. While this candor is refreshing, it probably does not
measure up to the DWR director's duty to insure no jeopardy. NEB. REV. STAT.
37-435(3).
352. R. BENTALL, NEBRASKA'S PLATTE RIVER: A GRAPHIc ANALYSIS OF FLOWS 45
(Univ. of Neb. Conservation & Survey Div. Neb. Water Paper 45, July 1982).
353. NEBRASKA NATURAL RESOURCES COMMISSION, PLATTE RIVER FORUM FOR THE
FUTURE 20 (Jan. 1985).
354. HIGH PLAINS STUDY, supra note 212, at 28.
355. A. BLEED, N. GOLLEHON, D. RAZAVIAN & R. SUPALLA, supra note 344, at 135, 116-
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Ironically, a policy of regulating ground water withdrawals could
make an impoundment policy more successful. The High Plains Study
estimated that the number of irrigated acres reverting to dryland in
the central Platte-Blue River region would fall from 788,000 to
310,000, a 61% reduction, if ground water withdrawals were reduced
30%.356 This would significantly reduce the gap between irrigated
acres lost to depletion and irrigated acres maintained by impound-
ment. In this writer's opinion the "need" for water projects would be
significantly reduced if not obviated by strict ground water regula-
tions. However, this alternative has not yet received serious policy
consideration.
The belief that Nebraska can prevent the reversion of thousands of
acres to dryland production through impoundment alone is an expen-
sive mirage. Only through significant restrictions on irrigation ground
water withdrawals can a sustainable level of irrigation be established.
Focusing on this issue, rather than how impoundment projects can be
implemented and financed, would better serve Nebraska's long range
water policy interests.
24, estimate that the total cost of economically and environmentally feasible
water projects would be less, as would be the total irrigation water supply
benefits.
356. HIGH PLAINS STUDY, supra note 212, at 28.
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